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INTRODUCTION
For more than a year now, nearly every day one can read
in the newspapers about atrocities that occur in the
conflict about the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic cleansing1 and
mass deportation of muslims in Banja-Luka and other
villages, concentration camps2, systematic rape of women of
the enemy3, massacres on the civil population,4 destruction
of private and public property and cultural heritage and so
on. Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait in 1989. After his
defeat, he persecuted thousands of Shiits and Kurds. For
months in Somalia war lords like Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali
Mahdi Mohamed prevented the supply of food for a starving
population5 and ordered mass killings of members of the
enemy clan.6 In Turkey for years the government has fought
with immense efforts against members of the Kurdish Workers'
Party (PKK). According to Helsinki Watch "hundreds of
civilians have been massacred, nine journalists have been
murdered. ,,7 Both, the military and the PKK are responsible.
In Angola the UNITA is accused of murdering civilists.8 The
National Patriotic Front under their Chief Charles Taylor is
accused of being responsible for the death of thousands of
civilians in the course of the civil war in Liberia,
including the recent killing of five American nuns in a
Monrovia suburb. 9 In Kampuchea1o, Sri Lankall,
1
2Taj ikistan12, Armenia13, Azerbaij an14 , South Ossetia1S,
Guatemala16 and India17 civil war and civil strife cause
the loss of human lives. Again and again newspapers give
information of torture and of killing of the civilian
population. The list could go on for hundreds of pages. The
annual report of AI relates numerous pages of evidence of
further human rights violations. Tragically, since the end
of the cold war, in many regions of the world there is a
proliferation of wars and civil wars. Because of this and
the high actuality of the arising issues, as the title of
the work reveals, the investigation will concentrate on
situations of armed conflicts in the broader sense. We will
investigate the special problems that arise under the
consideration of actual examples of armed conflicts.
For several reasons, most of the perpetrators do not
have to fear any prosecution on the national level. First,
in situations of an international war any nation hesitates
to destroy the picture of their own heroes and often the
enemy is not in the hand of the party whose people are
victims.18 Likewise, in many situations of civil war
prosecution is simply factually impossible because there
exists no functioning state order or, where it exists, only
the insurgents are tried. The prosecution of the members of
the regular armed forces is mostly in the case of a coUP
d'etat probable. But even if soldiers are tried by the
enemy, the danger of sacrificing impartiality exists.19 So,
the question arises: Is there any evidence of international
3law that establishes individual responsibility of actors or
supplies any set of rules that gives the world community the
opportunity to define their acts as unlawful, to prosecute,
try and punish the perpetrators? If yes, the consequent
issue is, who can be tried: The subordinate soldier, who
committed the atrocity, the military commanders, who ordered
or at least omitted to prevent them, policy makers like
Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, Jonas Savimbi of
the UNITA, Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed in
Somalia, Velupillai Prabhakaran of the Tamil Tigers and
other state officials, rebel leaders and the inferior
soldier, who turned the atrocities? The intention of this
work is to show the tools existing international law
provides.20
Connected questions are, who should try them:
international or national tribunals? Looking back in history
one finds only one outstanding example of an international
tribunal: The trials of Nuernberg and Tokyo after the second
World War. For many years, it seemed to be an exception
without repetition. After the liberation of Kuwait from the
Iraqi occupation, President Bush publicly thought about a
trial against Saddam Hussain.21 This remained only an
idea. However, only two years later and 50 years after the
Declaration of St. James, the current occurrences in the
former Yugoslavia revived the idea of an international
tribunal that would try war criminals. In 1992 U.N.
Resolutions 767, 771 and 780, the Security Council stated
4the responsibility of the individuals committing war crimes
in the former Yugoslavia. On February 22, 1993, with U.N.
Resolution 808, the Security Council decided on the
establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute
serious violations of international humanitarian law. The
problems arising in Resolution 808 are manifold and include
new issues, for example, the competence of the Security
Council for the establishment of the tribunal. Reports of
France,22 Italy23 and the CSCE24 that investigated the
issue of an ad hoc international tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia provide interesting documents about the current
state of international law on the issue.
The set of rules applicable to crimes in situations of
armed conflicts is imperfect. However, since the Nuernberg
trials scholars,25 distinctive societies of international
lawyers26 and above all the 6th Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly, the International Law
Commission,27 worked and continues to work on a Code that
establishes for different kinds of international crimes
individual responsibility.28 After restarting its work in
1980, the first reading of the draft took place in 1991 and
the comments of the members of the U.N. had to be given on
January 1, 1993. The intention of the draft is to elaborate
a comprehensive convention that in part codifies and in part
establishes the old idea of direct individual responsibility
for the most heinous crimes and, on the other hand, to
deliver "an instrument intended to serve as a guide for a
5
political organ such as the Security Council. "29 The views
of States were divided. However, the work goes on and
D.N.S.C. Resolution 808 proves that a comprehensive tool for
the prosecution of certain crimes is more necessary today
than ever. The legal value of the ILC Draft for our inquiry
is its triple nature: Partly the draft intends to create new
international law; partly it is a mere reiteration of
existing conventional law; and, partly it is a codification
of existing customary international law. Furthermore, the
work of the ILC proves that the international community is
concerned about the issue.3D The legal quality of this
committee is assured because it consists of many
distinguished international lawyers from different
countries.
The structure of this paper follows a different
approach than most of the existing literature. From the
topic "individual responsibility for crimes under the law of
wars" logically four main problems arise - apart from a
number of related issues. First, determining the
international instruments and documents in which individual
responsibility is established and the scope ratione
personae? Second, determining the actus reus under the laws
of war for which individual responsibility exists (scope
ratione materiae)? Third, determining how the prosecution
and punishment of the perpetrators works and what organ or
institution tries them? Fourth, determining the kind of
armed conflicts for which the existing set of rules are
6applicable. The author is well aware that from this
structure there will be some disadvantages like the
inevitable consequence of some overlapping and the use of
several references from one Chapter to the other. However,
the advantage and the purpose of this article is to give an
evaluation of the current state of international law on the
different issues and to speak in favor of the chosen way.
In many current articles on the subject, the
qualification and evaluation of and conclusions about these
different issues are confused.31 Furthermore the reader
will be able to compare the different content of the
documents and instruments. This is of special importance for
the evaluation and proof of existing or emerging customary
international law. For this purpose, at the beginning of
each Chapter, a list of international instruments and
documents and a survey of the legal and historical
development is given. However, where this structure was not
adequate, the author deviated from this method.
Considerable space is dedicated to introductory remarks at
the beginning of the chapters to explain different terms
used in the relevant field of international law. Despite
limited space the author regards this necessary to provide a
sufficient understanding of the overall system and the
position of the different issues within this system.
Likewise, it may help to clarify any confusion that may
exist because of the different use and understanding of
certain terms in the literature used.
7
Consequently, the paper will begin by investigating the
existence of individual responsibility in conventional and
customary international laws of war. Then, it will examine
the scope ratione personae that the current international
law on individual responsibility covers, how it is related,
and what mode of conduct is embraced. At the end of this
first chapter, the most important exception to
responsibility is given consideration. With the result of
Chapter I in mind, turn to the issue of what actus reus
individual responsibility is provided for, i.e., the scope
ratione materiae. Chapter III examines the kind of conflicts
for which the available set of rules are applicable. This
problem arises mainly with regard to the Geneva rules.
Chapter IV addresses the enforcement mechanism, i.e.,
issues like the implementation, prosecution, penalty and
punishment, and institution that will try the perpetrators.
Finally, problems arising from involvement of the United
Nations in the conflict will be discussed.
CHAPTER I
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
1. Preliminary Remarks: Subjects of International Law,
Classification of Duties of the Individual under
International Law and Indirect and Direct Individual
Responsibility under International Law.
Originally subjects of international law were "first
and foremost ... State [s] besides corporate entities. ,,32
However, because of corporate entities in the 20th century,
the individual human being became more and more the subject
of international law. According to the realistic school that
is prevailing today among writers, the primary subject of
international law remains states; but, the individual can
also, be under certain circumstances, be the subject of
international law.33 On the one hand the individual may be
the indirect subject of international law as the "duties and
rights of States are only duties and rights of the members
who compose them". 34 In this case we deal not with true
rights and duties, but with a reflex of the rights and
duties of states. Because of that, the individual may also
be direct subject of international law. In the words of
Yoram Dinstein: "[T]he individual human being is not merely
the indirect subject of international law. Sometimes, he
bears international rights and duties directly, without the
interposition of the legal personality. ,,35 Consequently,
8
9duties and obligations, in other words responsibility of the
individual human being may be imposed on the individual
either directly as a subject of international law or
indirectly through the State. As we will see, the current
state of international law producing individual
responsibility is far from being conclusive. Nevertheless,
one should bear in mind that the "transformation of the
position of the individual is one of the most remarkable
developments in contemporary international law." 36
The duties of the individual under international law
may classified into four groups:37 (1) Responsibility of
privates other than of a criminal nature, e.g instruction
for the employees of international organizations like the
OECD or the United Nations, (2) general duties of the
individual to the community as a whole and (3) in particular
the protection of human rights,38 (4) and finally criminal
responsibility. Only the latter one is the main object of
this paper. However, in the field of non-international
conflicts the protection of human rights accomplishes the
lack of provisions that supply criminal responsibility.
Criminal responsibility may be established either
direct and indirect. There are duties of the individual of
which the actus reus is defined in international law, but
penalty, punishment and prosecution only exist after the
implementation of international law into municipal law. In
these cases the individual is punishable on ground of the
municipal legal order. Like in the Geneva Conventions of
10
1949, States have only the obligation (or choice) either to
try or to extradite the perpetrator.39 On the other hand
responsibility, penalty, prosecution and punishment of the
individual perpetrator may exist on grounds of international
law (e.g trials of Nuernberg and Tokyo). Clearly, the first
case is only an indirect responsibility under international
law, whereas the latter case is purely a direct one.
Disputed among commentators is the qualification of the
cases in between, as most international instruments are.40
For our purpose the dispute has not been resolved. We
will investigate both indirect and direct individual
responsibility.
2. Sources of Individual Responsibility in International
Laws of War
Individual responsibility for crimes under the laws of
war is for centuries a concern of municipal legal orders.
The first proofs for conventional international law that
addresses to this issue appeared in the second half of the
18th century. Since then several instruments and
documents41 deal with this problem. The following list of
instruments an documents is neither conclusive nor complete.
However it reflects the important sources of international
law:
1. Art. 47, 5942 of the Lieber Instructions of 1863
2. Art. 41 of The Hague Convention No. II, Article
of The Hague Convention No. IV. of 1899 and 1907-.--
3. Art. 229 of Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919)
4. Inter-Allied Declaration of St. James, signed 13
January 1942.
5. Moscow Declaration of 1943
11
6. Art. 1 of the Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, signed at London on 8 August 1945.
7. Art.1 and 6 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (which is on grounds of Art. 2 of the
London Agreement an integral part of the latter).
8. Control Council Law No.10, 20 December 1945
9. Principle 1 of Nuernerg Principles of 1950
10. Special proclamation of the Supreme Commander in the
Far East for the Allied Powers of January 1946 (Tokyo
Military Tribunal)
11. Art. 4 of the Genocide Convention
12. Art. 49 of Geneva Convention I, art. 50 of Geneva
Convention II, art. 129 of Geneva Convention III and
art. 146 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949.
13. Art. 1 of ILC Draft Code of 1954
14. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
15. Art. 3 of ILC Draft Code of 1991
16. D.N.S.C. Res. 764 (1992), 771 (1992), 780 (1992) and
808 (1993)
2.1. History and Legal Development
One of the first sources that provides individual
responsibility for crimes against the laws of war are the
Lieber Instructions of 1863. The Lieber Code was drafted by
Professor Francis Lieber during the American Civil War. It
is significant because it is one of the first attempts to
codify the laws of war and "correspond to a great extent to
the laws and customs of war existing at that time. "43
Furthermore it had decisive impact on the subsequent
codification of the Laws of War like The Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907. Articles 47 and 59, paragraph 1, of the
Lieber Code44 are one of the first regulations that provide
individual responsibility. The wording of the grave
breaches system in the Geneva Law 1949 reveals remarkable
similarities. The regulations were addressed to American as
12
well as the enemy soldiers, who committed certain unlawful
acts in the course of the American Civil War.
The Haque Conventions of 1899 and 190745 do not
contain provisions that establish individual responsibility
for war crimes. The reason for this was that the competence
to try his own nationals46 for war crimes was a long
existing customary law and part of the Sovereignty of State
Doctrine. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, however,
are not more than an already existing codification of
customary international law. However, beyond the competence
to try his nationals, Article 41 of Convention No. II of
1899 and Article of Convention No. IV of 1907 provides
that "[a] violation of the terms of the armistice by private
individuals acting on their own initiative, only confers the
right of demanding the punishment of the offender .... ,,47
Whether this obligation to try its own nationals for certain
war crimes was already existing customary international
law48 or constituted the development of new conventionary
international law is not fully clear. Here is one of the
decisive differences to the Geneva Law of 1949 that reflects
the principle of universality and provides the obligation to
try or extradite its own as well as foreign nationals that
are accused of war crimes.49 This obligation with regard to
foreign nationals was, however, not absolutely known: "[A]
specific duty for states to take legislative measures for
the repression of certain infractions was laid down for the
first time in the Geneva Wounded and Sick Conference of
13
1906, and the next year at the Second Hague Peace Conference
(X) for the Adaption to Maritime Warfare of the Principles
of the Geneva Convention. ,,50 However, until 1949, neither
Geneva nor The Hague Law contained any further regulations
establishing a responsibility of the individual.
After the end of the first World War another attempt to
hold individuals responsible for crimes against the laws of
war was not very successful. Articles 227-230 of the
Versailles Peace Treaty of 191951 provided a certain
individual responsibility. Article 229, paragraph I,
provides that:
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals
of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be
brought before the military tribunals of that Power.52
Indeed, this provision does not explicitly provide that
the individual is responsible for crimes against the laws of
war; however, one may conclude from the recognition of the
German Government that the Allies have the right to
prosecute German perpetrators "accused of having committed
acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. ,,53 The
Treaty of Sevres54 between the Allied Powers and Turkey
also contained individual responsibility. However, this
provision of both treaties was never executed.55 But even
in the case of the application of Article 229 one can merely
speak of a responsibility of the individual on grounds of
international law as the judgement of the military tribunal
"should nonetheless be based on preexistent municipal
14
law .... "56 If one agrees that individual responsibility in
international law, regardless of whether it is direct or
indirect, is the definition of the scope rationae personae
and materiae in international instruments and is
prerequisite, then one hardly can speak of an example for
our purpose.
The Trials of Nuernberg and Tokyo
Already in 1942 Governments of nine European States
signed the Declaration of St. James57, which was
"reiterated in official statements by the U.S.A., Great
Britain and USSR and other Allied Governments. "58 They
agreed that "those guilty or responsible ...are sought out,
handed to justice and judged ...." 59 On October 7, 1942,
the establishment of an United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC) for the investigation of war crimes was announced
and one year later realized. On August 8, 1945, the four
Allied signed the London Agreement60, which provided in
Article 1 the establishment of
an International Military Tribunal for
the trials of war criminals whose offenses have
no particular geographical location whether they
be accused individually or in their capacity as
members of organizations or groups or in both
categories. 61 This wording reflects that
according to the Moscow Declaration of 30 October
194362 crimes with geographic location should be
judged on grounds of municipal law in the country,
where the crime was committed. Article 6 of the
IMT63 then stated that for" [t]he following acts,
... [thereafter cited the actus reus of crimes
against peace, humanity and war crimes] there
shall be individual responsibility. "64
15
However this international individual responsibility
(and prosecution by the IMT) was manifoldly restricted. As
the title of the London Agreement already indicates, the
scope ratione personae was in two ways narrowed: First only
war criminals of the European Axis powers were prosecuted,
and, the trials were restricted to the major war criminals.
All other 'minor' war criminals should be individual
responsibility and should be judged on grounds of the
municipal law of the country, where the atrocities were
committed.65 This idea was reconsidered in connection with
the establishment of a war crime tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.66 The scope rationae tempore was limited to war
crimes during the second World War and for the trials of the
Nuernberg Tribunal. In January 1946, for the war criminals
of the Far East the Tokyo Military Tribunal was established
by Special Proclamation of the Supreme Commander of the Far
East (General McArthur) of the Allied Powers. The
regulations of the Special Proclamation of the Supreme
Commander in the Far East was substantially identical.67
The new quality of Nuernberg and Tokyo with regard to
individual responsibility is that, first, never before and
since then have such a number of individuals been held
individually responsible for their wrong-doing on the basis
of an international instrument. In the words of Frits
Kalshoven, Nuernberg and Tokyo constitute the "high-water-
mark" of individual responsibility for crimes against the
laws of war.68 Second, the IMT - and the subsequent
16
tribunals that followed them - rejected the arguments of the
defendants that international law cannot impose duties on
the individual. 69
2.2. Current State of Law
a. Conventional International Law
Because of the scope ratione temporis the London
Agreement and Charter of the IMT is not a valid
international instrument.7o One of the most important
currently valid Conventions establishing individual
responsibility is the Genocide Convention, which is ratified
by the majority of States.7! It was inspired by the Nazis'
"Endlosung" for the Jewish people and should in the future
prevent any recurrence of attempts to exterminate ethnic or
religious groups. It is applicable in time of peace as well
as in time of war, and especially in the latter case it
gains great importance.72 Article 4 of the Genocide
Convention73 says that
Persons committing genocide or any other acts
enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether
they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals.
Beside the Genocide Convention the four Geneva
Conventions of 194974 and the Additional Protocols of
197775 are the most important instruments in the
humanitarian laws of war. Article 49 of Convention (I),
Article 50 of Convention (II), Article 129 of Convention
(III) and Article 146 of Convention (IV) constitute the
implementation mechanism of the Geneva Conventions.
17
Moreover, they set forth a system of indirect individual
responsibility. Article 146, paragraph I, of the Third
Geneva Convention, e.g.,76 states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention defined in the following Article.77
Only the actus reus is defined in international law78,
but penalty, prosecution and punishment are left to
municipal law. One may argue that the Geneva Conventions are
not examples of indirect responsibility of individuals
because no provision establishes it explicitly.
Nevertheless, Article 49 of Convention I, Article 50 of
Convention II, Article 129 of Convention III and Article 146
of Convention IV oblige the High Contracting Parties to
provide penal sanctions for the perpetrators, who committed
"grave breaches II of the Conventions. From this wording, at
least indirectly,79 follows that the Geneva Conventions
regard the individual as responsible for the acts
constituting grave breaches. One of the weaknesses of the
Geneva Conventions is that no provision like Article 8 of
the Charter of IMT deals with justifications, excuses or
mitigating circumstances. All this remains in the field of
domestic law of the State that judges the perpetrator.
Whereas the Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocol I
that enlarges the Conventions, provide at least the system
of indirect individual responsibility, Additional Protocol
II, that applies to non-international conflicts, does not
18
provide any implementation mechanism. Consequently,
Additional Protocol II confers no obligation on the High
Contracting Parties to try to prosecute perpetrators in non-
international conflicts. This, and the failure of direct and
indirect individual responsibility in Additional Protocol
II, are the most criticized weaknesses of the Geneva law.
Apart from the foregoing indirect responsibility
approach, it should be added that one may also assume that
there exists direct individual responsibility for the
committing of grave breaches of the Geneva Law.8o As we
will see81 the notion "grave breaches" is a synonym for
"war crimes." If one accepts the view of most
commentators82 that the Nuernberg Principle of direct
individual responsibility under international law for war
crimes is today customary international law, then, the
commitment of "grave breaches" against the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols also produces direct
individual responsibility of the perpetrators on grounds of
customary international law. This approach could be of
important relevance with regard to non-international
conflicts, i.e., Article 3 common of the four Geneva
Conventions and above all Additional Protocol II, that does
not foresee an implementation-system like the four
Conventions. Moreover this approach would make it possible
to judge perpetrators by international organs on grounds of
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 83
19
Especially in the conflict about the former Yugoslavia
(e.g., destruction of historic center of Dubrovnic) another
international instrument providing indirect international
responsibility (i.e., by means of implementation) has to be
considered: The Hague Convention on Cultural Property.84
Article 28 of The Hague Convention confers upon the HIGH
CONTRACTING PARTIES the obligation to
...take, within the framework of their ordinary
criminal legislation, all necessary steps to prosecute
and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those
persons, of whatever nationality, who commit or order
to be committed a breach of the present Convention.8s
b. Customary International Law
As has been seen, individual responsibility as
specified in the Londoner Agreement was restricted to war
crimes during World War II. Questionable is whether apart
from existing treaty law there exists customary
international law that provides individual responsibility
for crimes against the laws of war (1) in general, or, if at
least the Nuernberg principle of direct individual
responsibility (2) for the herein mentioned crimes86 -
respectively (3) some of them - (a) was already at this time
or (b) has become apart from the Geneva Law binding
customary international law. In the Commentary to the
Nuernberg Principles the ILC asserted
the Commission adopted a formulation of the principles
of international law which were recognized in the
Charter of the Nuernberg tribunal and the Judgement of
the Tribunal.87
20
That is to say that following the ILC, individual
responsibility was already recognized before the Nuernberg
trials. For individual responsibility in general, as we saw,
this assertion is without sufficient proof.88 Therefore,
the title "Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgement of the
Tribunal" is misleading. The task of the ILC was "not to
express any appreciation of these principles as principles
of international law, but merely to formulate them. ,,89
More serious, however, is the question that since
Nuernberg, does customary international law provide
individual responsibility in general for crimes against the
laws of war. Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ mentions
as prerequisites for customary international law the
existence of state practice and the recognition as legally
binding. Since Nuernberg a considerable amount of
international documents90 has reiterated the principle of
individual responsibility for certain crimes against the
laws of war. For our purpose we will concentrate on the two
major sources, United Nations Resolutions and the Drafts of
the ILC.
As early as in 1946 the General Assembly91 "affirme [d]
the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the
tribunal." Some remarks are necessary in advance as to the
legal quality of Resolutions of the General Assembly.
Before World War II "the word 'resolution' was normally used
21
in the sense of a binding decision made by an international
organization .... ,,92 However, Resolutions of the General
Assembly have no binding force. The system of the Charter of
the United Nations only in Chapter VII gives the Security
Council the power to make mandatory decisions in the case of
a threat of breach of peace or acts of aggression. The view
of Third World Countries and the former Communist Block that
G.A.-Resolutions are a new source of law is neither proved
by the system of the Charter of the United Nations nor
reflects the practice of states. However, they may either
convert into international law if State practice treats them
as legally, and not morally, binding or may be an indicator
for State practice with respect to emerging international
law. Resolution 95 (I) may be qualified as a first step.
Since 1950 the ILC worked on a codification of the Principle
of individual international responsibility.
In 1950, they released the Formulation of the Nuremberg
Principles93 on grounds of the direction by the G.A. in
Resolution 95 (I). Principle I, that is based on Article 6
of the Charter of the IMT, provides that" [a]ny person who
commits an act which constitutes a crime under international
law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." The
new quality is, that in the future not only the perpetrators
of the vanquished state are liable. Furthermore, the ILC
attempted to introduce individual responsibility as general
principle for any crime under international law. However,
this proposal was never adopted by the General Assembly. In
22
the consequent years the ILC elaborated the "Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 1194
Article 1 states that II [o]ffenses against the peace and
security of mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes
under international law, for which the responsible
individuals shall be punished. II However, in 1954, the work
on the Code was postponed for several reasons.95 In 1980
the General Assembly called on the ILC to revive its work on
the Draft Code. 96
Until its 43rd session, the ILC under its special
rapporteur DouDou Thiam comprehensively enlarged the number
of crimes for which individual responsibility should be
provided. 97 After its first reading, the draft was given
to the member States of the United Nations to make their
comments and proposals, which should be handed in until
January I, 1993. Article 3, paragraph I, holds that II [a]n
individual who commits a crime against the peace and
security of mankind is responsible therefore and is liable
to punishment. II According to Mr. Rosenstock, Legal Advisor
of the United States at the United Nations and a member of
the ILC, the comments were mostly negative because of the
far-reaching and different crimes that should be included.
Therefore, at present it seems unlikely that the draft will
be adopted in its current shape or presented as convention.
In short, individual responsibility under international law
for crimes in general is not feasible at the current state
of international law. Therefore, individual responsibility
23
For war crimes the situation is different. Most
herein to affirm direct international individual
It is unlikely to prove that States regard
This view may also be approved from the theoretical
[nJowadays, ...punishment is also justified by
indisputable norms of international customary law,
thanks to the development of international law that has
since taken place as a result of both domestic and
international case law, treaty practice and United
Nations resolutions; 102
has become widely accepted as an international legal
international law. "Individual responsibility for war crimes
this view also .100 Explaining the legitimacy of the
in general for crimes against the laws of war is currently
norm .... ,,99 The Committee of French Jurists, in a letter
repetitions in international documents individual
responsibility for war crimes forms today part of customary
to be proved.
the content of these documents as legally binding.
dated from February 10, 1993, to the United Nations takes
the former Yugoslavia, they conclude that
establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal - and
commentators recognize that because of the various
not part of customary international law. 98
every actus reus the intention or consciousness is difficult
prerequisite can be compensated in a case where the practice
Therefore, some scholars recognize that lack of this
responsibility - to judge the (war)101 crimes committed in
mentioned documents lack binding force. However, as for
outset for customary international law. Indeed, all of the
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is "virtually uniform. ,,103Finally some remarks concerning
the issue of war crimes jurisdiction in customary
international law should be made. In as early sources as
article 71 of the Lieber Instructions1W the rule of
customary international law is laid down that from the
"... right of the belligerents to enforce the laws of
war,,105the war crimes jurisdiction over its own and the
enemy soldiers derives. "[w]ar crimes jurisdiction
[, therefore,] is optional," 106i.e., offenders of the laws
of war that are within one States territory may be tried by
this State. Against the former enemy State one has the right
to demand the prosecution of war criminals. 107
For the substantive content of the crimes against
humanity the situation is easier. The actus reus is nowadays
embraced by the Genocide Convention in part and by the grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention in part108 and grants
individual responsibility as shown in context with
instruments .109Individual responsibility for crimes
against peace is most disputed. Here, it may be only
mentioned that the answer will be presumably negative.llo
2.3. United Nations Security Council Resolution
In the conflict about the former Yugoslavia, a third
source of binding international law apart from conventional
and customary international law emerged that may establish
(directll1) individual responsibility: Mandatory
resolutions of the Security Council under Chapter VII.
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In D.N.S.C. Resolution 771112 (1992) the Security Council
reaffirmed
that all parties to the conflict are bound to comply
with their obligations under international humanitarian
law and in particular with the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order
the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are
individually responsible in respect such breachesil13
At first glance, the resolution only repeats existing
international law. However, there also could arise a
constituting character. In the case of the former Yugoslawia
with regard to the Geneva Conventions this is without
relevance because all parties in the conflict gave
declaration that they accept the Geneva Conventions.1~
However, the Genocide Convention remains that only
Yugoslavia signed, however, not the successor states. From
the standpoint of international law with regard to
succession in treaties, the successor states Serbia and
Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegowina and Slowenia are not
automatically bound to these instruments. With the
reiteration that all parties of the conflict are bound,
especially to the Geneva Convention. Second, the resolution
indicates that in contrast to the system of indirect
individual responsibility in the Geneva Conventions, the
judgement and prosecution may not be handled by municipal
courts, but by an ad hoc international tribunal. This was
decided, on February 1993, by the Security Council in
Resolution 808 (1993).115 The author will discuss this
issue in more detail later in this manuscript.
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3. Scope ratione personae
After examining to what extent international law
provides individual responsibility, the next step is to
consider who may be responsible and closely related to this,
what mode of conduct is covered by individual
responsibility. The scope rationae personae extends to three
levels: (1) Head of States and officials of the State, (2)
Military Commanders and (3) the subordinate soldier. For
each level special problems arise. The following instruments
and documents address in particular to one or more of the
different levels:
1. Art. 227 of Peace Treaty of Versailles
2. Art. 6 para. 3 and Art. 7 of Charter of the
International Military Tribunal
3. Principle III and IV of Nuremberg Principles in
G.A.-Res. 3(1) and 95(1) of 1950
4. Art. 3 of ILC Draft of 1954
5. Art. 12, 13 of the ILC Draft of 1991
6. Art. 86 para.1 and 2 and art. 87 para. 1 of Protocol I
of Geneva Conventions
7. Art. IV of Genocide Convention
8. Art. 2 of Convention on Statutory Limitations
9. Art. Art. VI, VII of Annex V of the French Report
3.1. Head of States and official position
With regard to responsibility of Head of States and
officials of States two main issues arise: (1) Head of State
or official position as freeing from punishment on grounds
of immunity because of the Act of State Doctrine and (2)
responsibility of Head of State or officials for the mere
formulation (as mode of acting) of crimes under laws of war.
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a. Immunity According to the Act of State Doctrine
Legal Development and History
Before World War I under "customary international
law ... Heads of State were above the law and could not be
punished .... "116 After the defeat of Napoleon I, Prussian
General Gneisenau suggested "to put the Emperor ...on trial
for the wars he had initiated. "117 The same intention can
be found in Article 227, paragraph 1, of the Peace Treaty of
Versailles, which states that
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign
Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor,
for supreme offenses against international morality and
the sanctity of treaties.118
The trial of the German Emperor, however, never took
place. Wilhelm III was given asylum in The Netherlands.
With this experience after World War II the Allied provided
in Article 7 of the Charter of the IMT that
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads
of States or responsible officials in Government
Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.119
Regardless of this provision, in the trials one common
argument of the defendants belonging to the policy making
level was that the Act of State Doctrine as part of
international law grants immunity. The IMT dismissed this
and said:
The principle of international law which under certain
circumstances protects the representatives of a State
cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as
criminal by international law120 [i. e. where] ... the
State in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law.
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Current State of Law
One of the great achievements of Nuernberg surely is
that nowadays it is unquestioned that the Act of State
Doctrine, at least, does not grant immunity from criminal
conduct. Indeed this is laid down only in few international
instruments. Apart of Article 4 of the Genocide
Convention,121 only Article 2 of the Statutory Limitation
Convention can be mentioned. The Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols remain silent on this issue. However
the relevant consecutive documents122 since World War II
reiterated this principle and prove at least for criminal
action the conclusion of the French Commission of Jurists
that immunity on grounds of "Act of State does not
exist"U3 as part of customary international law.
Notwithstanding, one should keep in mind, that this does not
preclude that the official position may be regarded as
mitigating circumstance by the tribunal. In all the
Nuernberg trials following drafts the ILC omitted the
passage of Article 7 of the Charter of the IMT "or
mitigating punishment" as it "considers that the question of
mitigating punishment is a matter for the competent Court to
decide. 11124
If one follows with the majority of commentators this
view of the ILC,uS then leaders like Saddam Hussain,
Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic or Charles Taylor
were responsible under international law for war crimes they
committed. As they will not commit the crimes themselves,
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however, they will defend that they never committed the
crimes. Hence, it is necessary to define different modes of
conduct that establish individual responsibility.
3.2 Mode of Conduct: commitment, ordering, incitement and
omission, complicity, conspiracy.
With the consciousness that no immunity is granted, we
can step forward to examine what mode of conduct is embraced
by individual responsibility. To avoid any confusion, the
author wants to point out that the following consideration
only investigates existing individual responsibility, as
stated above under point 2. This must especially for the
section of customary international law be kept in mind. The
mode of committing is without further problem embraced.
However, in most cases only the subordinate soldier commits
the crime. An effective deterrent and also equilibrated
justice, however, only can be achieved if beside the
subordinate level also the policy-making level and the
intermediate level of the superior Military Commanders are
considered to be individually responsible for their conduct.
Hence, different modes of conduct have to be investigated.
Military Commanders in general only ordered the commitment
or even less, they only omitted to prevent the atrocity.
High ranking state officials probably incited or formulated
a policy that encouraged the crimes. Besides, other modes of
conduct like attempt, conspiracy or complicity will be
addressed.
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History and Legal Development
Let us begin with the IIhigh-water markll126of
individual responsibility, the trials of Nuernberg and
Tokyo. Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the IMT
covered the commitment of the crime. After the experience
with the Leipzig Trial, this time regulations were issued
that should ensure to cover also the policy making level.
Article 6, paragraph 3, of the IMT, therefore, provides:
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices
participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such a
plan.127
By including participating in the formulation of a
common plan to commit crimes against the laws of war, the
prosecution of the policy-level was ensured. This is one
decisive new element. Modes of conduct like conspiracy,
complicity and incitement always depend on the proof of the
actual committed crime. This gives in trial very often a
difficult burden of proof. Consequently, the Charter
preferred to declare the mere IIparticipation in the
formulationll as unlawful act without any link to the actual
execution of the crime. Whether this is a mere mode of
conduct128 or a separate form of crime (llcrime of
conspiracyll)129does not have to be resolved for our
purpose.
For the liability of the intermediate level of military
commanders conspiracy as mode of unlawful action covered the
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ordering of the crimes.130 Beside these two modes of
conduct originally the IMT did not affirm responsibility of
higher ranking officers or officials for omission. E.g. in
the case of Commander on the Sea Admiral Doenitz the court
did not investigate with regard of the killing of
shipwrecked survivors neither if "Doenitz knew about them
[nor if] he could have given orders for the piracy to be
stopped" 131 The issue of omission was first addressed by
the United Military Commission in Manila in the Yamashita
case.132 The historical background was the lack of proof
of orders of the Commanders in cases of the Military
Tribunal for the Far East. The Tribunal held that
the laws of war imposed on an army a duty to take such
appropriate measures as were within his power to
control the troops under his command and prevent them
from committing actions in violation of the laws of
war. 133
Weakness of this decision was that the Tribunal neither
considered the issue of whether Yamashita had control over
the crimes nor if he knew of them. In the trials against
Japanese foreign ministers Hirota, Shigemitsu and Togo the
Tribunal elaborated criteria to affirm criminal
responsibility for omission:
" [T]he principle of criminal responsibility for
omission to act cannot be denied, when the man in
authority knew, or should have known, that crimes were
regularly being committed, had the power of interfering
with the criminal practices, and had special
responsibility for the field in question. "134
Consequently there are two possibilities that create
individual responsibility of omission. One possibility is
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that the military superior knew of the crime. This, however,
is difficult to prove in a trial. Therefore, the second
alternative, that is similar to the principle of negligence
in municipal penal law, was of decisive importance. It was
sufficient if the responsible superior had under
consideration of all circumstances the possibility to know
and to prevent the crime. This holding was generally
accepted in the following trials. The IMT of Nuremberg ruled
similarly in the Hostage case,13S High Command trial,136
pohl trial137 and "Einsatzgruppen trial."13B
Current State of Law139
Conventional International Law
The grave breaches system of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions embrace (only) the mode of committing or
ordering to commit. 140 Other modes of conduct are left to
the municipal legal order. Article III of the Genocide
Convention141 is wider and also includes modes of conduct
like incitement, conspiracy, attempt and complicity to
commit genocide. Like in Article 6, paragraph 3, of the
Charter of the IMT the adoption of incitement and conspiracy
as modes of conduct should ensure a deterrence to the policy
making level. Questionable, however is if this concept
grants that political leaders like Karadzic or Milosevic can
be held responsible on grounds of the mere formulation of a
certain policy like ethnic cleansing. Because of the
problems of burden of proof with modes of conduct like
incitement and conspiracy, some scholars prefer to find a
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formulation that does not require the link to the actual
committed crime. The Committee of French Jurists, therefore,
proposed in its report investigating the legal framework for
a war crimes tribunal in former Yugoslavia to create a
separate crime that reads:
The crimes referred to article VI shall be deemed to
have been committed by any individual who ...
[p]articipated in drawing up a common plan to commit
the crime or have it committed, was associated in some
way with its implementation or its transmission to
persons called upon to execute it or gave general or
specific instructions for its execution, even in
part. 142
The Genocide Convention does not explicitly mention
orders of military commanders, but according to the
experience of the Nuernberg Trials this should be covered by
"complicity." However, it should be mentioned that this
solution has two weak points. First, it requires precise
orders to establish complicity and, second, no unlawful
conduct exists if the order is not executed. Especially in
the cases that the order was without any influence or
knowledge of the superior not executed the lack of sanction
for the order seems not to be justifiable.143 One possible
solution could be "to define [orders] as an offense in
itself the decision to use authority in a criminal
fashion .... ,,144
A first step toward the recognition of omission is laid
down in the Statutory Non-Application Convention of 1968.
Beside the mode of incitement and conspiracy Article 2
provides also that "representative of the State authority
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who tolerate their commissionll may be punishable. However,
the term tolerate seems only to cover omission if the
superior has knowledge of the crime. The first international
instrument that extends the responsibility of commanders to
omission quite similar to the holdings in the War Crimes
Tribunals was Article 86, paragraph 2, of 1977 Additional
Protocol I.145 It is important to keep in mind that the
provisions of Additional Protocol I also apply to the Geneva
Conventions. Consequently, under conventional law, military
commanders may be punished for omission to prevent grave
breaches of the four Conventions and for the ordering of
Genocide if the mentioned prerequisites are fulfilled.
Customary International Law
As we saw, the solution to cover order of superiors by
complicity, is not in any case a satisfying solution .146
Therefore, it remains important, that IIordering IIa crime is
an unlawful mode of action itself. Today it is undisputed
that IIorder IIas a mode of conduct is covered by individual
responsibili ty. 147 Indeed, e.g., the Nuernberg Principles
do not include any specific reference to lIorders.1IHowever,
complicity is regarded as to embrace IIorders IIas mode of
conduct. Yet, we saw that this solution is not satisfying in
every case. Complicity requires that the crime was actually
executed. Besides, individual responsibility for complicity
and attempt also may be regarded as part of customary
international law. Complicity was adopted in both, Principle
7 of the Nuernberg Principles148 and Article 2, paragraph
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13 (iii), of the ILC Draft of 1954.149 Article 3,
paragraph 2, of the 1991 Draft also includes complicity as
mode of conduct. The achievement of the ILC is that the
members agreed to formulate in the draft article the
definition that aids, abets or provides the means for the
commission of a crime are forms of complicity. 150 In
municipal criminal law, the problem arose as to what time
the complicity had to be given. Consent could be achieved
that complicity "prior to the perpetration of the crime or
during its commission constituted obvious cases of
complicity. ,,151 With most commentators152 the conclusion
that complicity is included, in cases where customary
international law provides individual responsibility, seems
legitimate.
Conspiracy and incitement are the same sources of
international documents as for complicity can be
mentioned. 153 It is remarkable that in the Nuernberg
Principle conspiracy was only considered for crimes against
peace. Article 3, paragraph 2, of the ILC Code of 1991 also
contains conspiracy and incitement. With regard to the
definition of incitement, two features are important to
mention: According to the members of the ILC, incitement
"did not have to be public in order to be punishable ... [but
afforded] the inten[tion] to encourage the perpetration of
certain crimes." 154 Since Nuernberg, the content of
conspiracy has been unanimously regarded as "participation
in a common plan for the commission of a crime ...."155
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Whether both modes of conduct are part of customary law
remains uncertain. 156
Lastly, mode of conduct attempt will be addressed.
There are very few sources on this subject. Only the Drafts
of the ILC contain considerations about this. 157However,
the members of the ILC were divided in the opinion as to
whether attempt should be punishable for all crimes or if an
"article-by-article analysis,,158would be more adequate. At
this point, customary international law is not in existence
at the current state.
More difficult is the issue on "omission." In some
municipal law orders omitting was and is punishable. An
example may be paragraph 501 of us Field Manual of 1958.159
Among the relevant major international documents only the
ILC Draft of 1991 considers the problem of omission. Beside
Article 2,160that mentions omission, Article 12 of the ILC
Draft of 1991 explicitly considers the issue:
The fact that a crime against the peace and security
of mankind was committed by a subordinate does not
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility, if
they knew or had information enabling them to conclude,
in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate
was committing or was going to commit such a crime
and if they did not take all feasible measures within
their power to prevent or repress the crime. 161
Regardless of the desirability and necessity, the
author hesitates to qualify the given examples as proof that
omission is a mode of conduct that customary international
law provides individual responsibility. In the commentary of
the ILC to Article 12, only the above mentioned trials after
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World War 11162are listed as proof. Perhaps it is more
adequate to state that omission, as an unlawful act for
crimes against the laws of war in general, is emerging as
customary law on its way into existence.
3.3. Defenses and Excuses
In the course of war criminal trials, defendants
introduced certain defenses and excuses that should prevent
individual responsibility. The most frequent arguments put
forward were limitation, non bis in idem,163 nulla poene
sine lege, duress,164 mistake,165 military necessity166
and reprisal.167 The latter two may be qualified as indirect
defenses because they refer to the level of State action.
However, "the effect of a defence successfully maintained by
the State may .... [also] exempt individuals from criminal
responsibility. ,,168This work will concentrate on two
defenses that are still debated today and will find
consideration in most of the relevant international
documents and instruments: the defense of superior order and
conformity of the action with internal law. "Nulla poene
sine lege" (also called the principle of non-retroactivity)
played a major role in the trials after World War I as well
as in the trials of Nuernberg and Tokyo. 169 However, the
current state of conventional and customary international
law170 is sufficiently developed so that in future trials
tribunals would not have to argue about this principle of
all major internal legal orders. Also, in the relevant
instruments and documents the principle of "nulla poene sine
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lege" is laid down and may, therefore, be regarded as part
of internal law.
3.3.1. Obedience to Superior Orders
The defense of superior order is one of oldest and most
frequently used. Early examples are the trial of Peter von
Hagenbach (Breisach Trial) of 1474,171 United States v.
Wirz after the American Civil War and Landovery Castle Case
before the Supreme Court of Leipzig after World War 1.172
The experience of the Leipzig trials after World War I,
where many defendants excused themselves with the argument
they were acting pursuant to superior orders, led to a
different approach after the defeat of the European Axis
powers. All in this part regarded instruments and documents
reveal a tendency towards:
1. Art. 8 of Londoner Agreement
2. Ex Parte Quirin
3. Principle 4 of Nuremberg Principles
4. Art. 4 of ILC Draft of 1954
5. Art. 11 of ILC Draft of 1991
6. Art. 7 para. 3 of the French Report
7. Art. 5 of the Italian Report
a. History and Legal Development
During the Nuernberg trials defendants argued that they
acted under the orders of Hitler. However, Article 8 of the
Charter of the IMT173 ordered that
[t]he fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order
of his government or of a superior shall not free him
from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigating the punishment if the Tribunal determines
that justice so requires.
This "middle of the road approach" was intended to give
consideration to the difficult situation of combatants.
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First, on grounds of municipal law, they are obliged to
comply with superior orders and will be punished if they
refuse to execute them. Second, for the normal soldier, in
many situations it may be difficult to decide if an order is
contrary to international law. But, on the other hand, the
prosecution was restricted to the "major" war criminals. The
second the IMT stated:
The provisions of this Article [8] are in conformity
with the laws of all nations. That a soldier was
ordered to kill or torture in violation of the
international law of war has never been recognized as a
defence to such acts of brutality though, as the
Charter here provides, the order may be urged in
mitigation of the punishment. The true test, which is
found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most
nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether
moral choice was in fact possible.1M
The statement of the IMT is in contrast to the opinion
juris before World War II. According to British and
American Army manuals of after World War "it was a complete
defense for a soldier to plead that the acts he committed
were in pursuance of an order from a superior officer. "175
Nevertheless, the criterion of "moral choice" seemed to be
an adequate mean of distinction, whether the excuse has to
be taken into consideration.
b. Current State of Law
Originally, a provision similar to Article 8 of the
Charter of the IMT should be implemented in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocol I. However,
neither the 1949 Diplomatic Conference nor the 1977
Diplomatic Conference adopted the provisions in the final
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drafts.176 Also the Genocide Convention is lacking a
provision dealing with the issue.
In contrast to this, in the relevant international
documents the barring of the defense of superior order has
found consideration. Two different approaches were used.
Principle IV of the Nuernberg Principle adopted the version
of the IMTi i.e., except in cases where no moral choice was
possible, superior orders do not relieve individual
responsibility.l77 In Article 4 of the ILC Draft of 1954
and Article 11 of the 1991 Draft (both, have substantially
identical wording) the criterion of "moral choice" was
replaced by the formulation, that the perpetrator had the
possibility not to comply with the order of his
superior .178 Whether this rule nowadays constitutes
binding international law is questionable.179 As we see,
any proof for conventional international law is missing.
Both Principle IV of Nuremberg as well as Article 4 of the
Draft were not approved by the General Assembly and the
result of the ILC Draft of 1991 remains to be seen. The ILC
seems to approve the existence of customary international
law.18o From this view we have cases like of Field Marshall
List and others181 that applied the rule that, basically,
the defense of superior order does not relieve individual
responsibility. It seems to be right when Levie writes that,
nevertheless, "something similar to the provisions set forth
... [in Article 8] will be followed in any future
trials ... :"182The reports of the Italian and French
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1991.183
Relevant international documents indicate the same
Indeed,
[t]he principle that a person who has committed an
international crime is responsible therefor and liable
to punishment under international law, independently of
the provisions of internal law, implies what is
commonly called the "supremacy" of international law
over national law. 188
Commission of Jurists, both, implemented in their Reports a
regulation that reflects Article 13 of the ILC Draft of
This defense goes back to the very roots of the
3.3.2 Confor.mity with internal law
Without discussing the different theories ,185 the reader
may be satisfied with the statement that nowadays among the
relationship between international and municipal law. 184
international law over municipal law is undisputed. This
overwhelming majority of international lawyers and in most
constitutions of nations186 the principle of supremacy of
both set of rules do not contain an explicit formulation of
internal law relieves individual responsibility. This
Principle II of the Principles of Nuernberg187 the ILC
criminal act with internal law. In the commentary to
outset is also decisive for the defense of conformity of the
consequently took the view that
for individual responsibility, the Geneva Conventions and
principle applies also to the two most important instruments
Additional Protocols and the Genocide Convention.
customary international law that the conformity with
opinion. 189 Hence, it may be concluded that it is
42
this rule. However, it is out of the question that "the
perpetrators of such violations cannot legitimately claim to
have acted in accordance with national law ... "190
CHAPTER II
THE ACTUS REUS OF CRIMES UNDER THE LAWS OF WAR
1. Definition and Confusion: International Criminal Law,
International Crimes, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law, War Crimes and Crimes Under the Laws of War.
1.1. Concept, Origin and Nature of International Criminal
Law; Criteria for International Crimes
Basic international criminal law is the part of
international law that imposes prohibitions on a certain
form of conduct of states or - nowadaysl91 - individuals.
"The international crime concept is based on the
philosophical and pragmatic notion that certain rules must
be upheld in the relations of nations if civilized
intercourse is to be possible among peoples of the
world. "192 Violations of these rules are considered
"contrary to jus gentium" with the consequence that every
state and individual is obligated to refrain from such
conduct.193 Hence, responsible perpetrators may be either a
State or an individual.194 The very outset of international
criminal law goes back to customary international rules.195
Sources reveal that acts like piracy and war crimes have
been forbidden even before Christ. 196 Crimes can be divided
in crimes in peace time and crimes in war time, the so
called crimes under the laws of war. 197
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Basic questions of every inquiry in the field of
international criminal law are (1) what is the content,
(2) how one may qualify an international instrument as
international criminal law and (3) what are the
characteristics of international criminal law. The latter
one has long been debated among scholars. Eight criteria
were developed.198 Levie refined this result and enlarged
the penal characteristics to the number of ten .199 If one
or more of these prerequisites are fulfilled, an
international instrument belongs to international criminal
law "even though it may not be so specifically stated in
that instrument. "200 Another expression sometimes used by
scholars is international offenses201 However, the content
and understanding are the same. 202
a. Categories of International Crimes
Similar to the criteria for the qualification of an
international crime the number of categories of
international crimes is answered in different ways by
scholars and commentators. M. Cherif Bassiouni 203 listed
twenty and Levie listed twenty-two categories of
international crimes. For our purpose both scholars found
the same distinction: 204
(1) Protection of Peace: Aggression (corresponds with
"Crimes against peace")
(2) Humanitarian Protection During Armed Conflicts, the
regulation of Armed Conflicts, and the Control of Weapons
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(a) War Crimes
(b) Unlawful Use of Weapons; Unlawful Emplacement
of Weapons
(3) Protection of Fundamental Human Rights
(a) Crimes Against Humanity20S
(b) Genocide
(c) Racial Discrimination and Apartheid
This paper will adopt this classification for the purpose of
this investigation. The set of rules described next belong
both to the humanitarian law:
1.3. The Law of the Hague and the Law of Geneva
Sometimes in the literature commentators only refer to
the pair of expression law of The Hague (droit de la Haye)
in contrast to law of Geneva (droit de Geneve). The former
set of rules refers basically to The Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907.206 These instruments regulate the behavior
of states or belligerent in situations of war on land and
sea and limited the means of warfare, 207 whereas the law of
Geneva contains the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1868, 1906,
1929 and 1949 and deals with the protection of civilians
during armed conflicts, of injured combatants and the
protection of prisoners of war (PoW).208 For our inquiry
they are of interest because part of this system of
protection are articles that define "war crimes" and provide
indirect international individual responsibility. 209 The
Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
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1949 adopted rules of the Law of The Hague as well as of the
Conventions of Geneva and, therefore, for the first time
created a symbioses of both. Already here may be indicated
that the Geneva Law can be divided into two set of rules:
One that is applicable in international, the other in non-
international conflicts.21o As we later will see this gives
reason for numerous problems and endless discussions.
The common goal of both, The Hague and the Geneva Law
is to improve the situation of the individuals participating
in or affected of war. Therefore, among most commentators
they are called humanitarian law.211 However, whereas the
Geneva Law directly forbids certain acts against certain
groups of persons212 The Hague Law regulates the use of
weapons and warfare and thus indirectly improves the
situation of the individual.
1.4. Humanitarian Law - Human Rights Law213
The notion of humanitarian law (droit humanitaire)214
is highly disputed among commentators. Three problems arise:
the relation between humanitarian law and human rights law,
the content of each set of rules and, finally, determining
to which set The Hague Law and the Geneva Law belong.
Picet21S uses the notion of "humanitarian law" as notion
covering both laws of war and human rights law.
Schindler216 differentiates between the law of The Hague
and the law of Geneva so that only the latter should form
humanitarian law. As discussed earlier, the Law of Geneva
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and of the Hague serves the same goal - only by different
tools: the protection of the individual in times of war.
Therefore, the approach of Schindler is not convincing. It
is better to follow the authors217 that draw under the
notion "humanitarian law" the Law of Geneva as well as that
of The Hague. This seems to be a reasonable classification.
Picet's proposal, despite his undeniable capacity, blurs the
frontiers between humanitarian law and human rights law: In
distinction to humanitarian rules of law, human rights law
(droit de l'homme) is applicable in peace-time and (partly)
in time of war. 218 Hence, beyond victims of war every human
being is protected. We deal, therefore, with different
bodies of law in respect to ratione personae and ratione
temporis: Human rights law covers humanitarian law, in part,
but not vice versa.
1.5. Crimes under the Law of War - War Crimes
The title of this work refers to crimes under the laws
of war. This notion covers three groups of crimes that goes
back to the traditional distinction between the Law
applicable in time of war and the Law applicable in
peacetime. The laws of war is "the body of rules which
governs relationships in war. ,,219 Under the former category
three different groups of crimes are classified: 220
(1) Crimes against Peace,
(2) War Crimes and
(3) Crimes against Humanity.
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Whereas crimes against peace refers to the Law regulating
the right (today better the prohibition) to resort to war
(ius ad bellum, respectively ius contra bellum), war crimes
contain the law prohibiting certain conducts during the time
of war (ius in bello) .221 Crimes against Humanity includes
Genocide, but connected with situations of war.
Finally, some remarks on the conclusiveness of the
"lawg of war." Ingrid Detter de Lupis prefer to use the
notion in its singular form, "law of war," to express that
this set of rules is "homogeneous". 222 This author is not
so optimistic as to give this high award to the existing
body of rules applicable in armed conflicts or wars.
Doubtless international law has been very successful with
regard to the laws of war in the past century. So, for
example, waging war today is absolutely prohibited.223
Furthermore, indeed, the Geneva law and the development of
humanitarian law is a great success in favor of those who
suffer most under wars: the civilian populations and
prisoners of war. Nevertheless under realistic view there
remain many gaps that have to be filled in future. Examples
may be the failure of an international criminal court, the
full applicability of the Geneva Law in non-international
armed conflicts and the permanent efforts to create a
Convention that provides for crimes under the laws of war
direct individual responsibility.
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2. Crimes against Peace (=Aggression)
This first category of crimes under the laws of war is
relatively new. Originally waging war was not a crime, but
the traditional right of every state emerging from its
sovereignty as State. Clausewitz called war the
continuation of politics by other means and this formula
represented the attitude of the majority of Nations.
Consequently, before the 20th century there existed no crime
against peace except the jus ad bellum, i.e., the right to
start war. Whether the doctrine of "just war" (bellum
iustum) was a restriction of the ius ad bellum is debatable.
Indeed, this doctrine required "a just cause in defense of
legitimate interests, impossibility of peaceful solution,
and proportionality between the wrong done and the planed
war. ,,224 However, the fulfillment of these prerequisites
decided only the concerned states themselves. At the
beginning of this century, conventional international law
appears that is the beginning of a development towards the
prohibition of aggression:
1. Drago Porter Convention (Convention II of The Hague
1907)
2. Article 11, 12, 15 para 7 and 8 of the Charter of the
League of Nations
3. Article 227 paragraph 1 of Peace Treaty of Versaille
4. Multilateral Treaty for Renunciation of War, signed at
27 August 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact)
5. Article 6 (a) of the Charter of the IMT of Nuernberg
6. Article 5 of the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East
7. Article 2 paragraph 1 (a) of Control Council Law No. 10
8. Principle 6 (a) of Nuernberg Principles
9. Article 2 of the ILC Draft of 1954
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10. Article 5 (2) of General Assembly Resolution 3314
(XXIX): Definition of Aggression
11. Article 15 and 16 of the ILC Draft of 1991
2.1. History and Legal Development: From Jus Ad Bellum to
Jus Contra Bellum
Together with the Conference of 1899, the Peace
Conference of The Hague of 1907225 was one of the first,
although failing, attempts to restrict the right to wage war
by certain rules. Convention I of 1907 contained a
declaration on obligatory arbitration for dispute
settlement. Convention II (Drago Porter Convention) .226
Probably the most significant result of the Conference,
contained the prohibition of use of force for the recovery
of contract debts. The obligation to settle disputes
between states by peaceful means like arbitration, of
course, is no condemnation of war itself. However, it was a
first attempt towards the restriction of the right to step
to war. The Drago Porter Convention may be qualified as the
first international instrument that made a step towards
modification of jus ad bellum to the now existing jus contra
bellum.
Article 227, paragraph I, of the Peace Treaty of
Versaille provided responsibility of the German Emperor
Wilhelm II "for a supreme offense against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties. "227 The notion
"supreme offence against international morality" contained
"[a]cts which provoked the world war and accompanied its
inception, "228 whereas the supreme offense against the
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sanctity of treaties referred to the breach of the
neutrality treaties of 1839 and 1867 with regard to the
invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium. Interesting is that the
Commission itself draw the conclusion that "the acts which
brought about the war should not be charged against their
authors .... ,,229 One reason therefore was that "a war of
aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary
to positive law .... "23o
The Covenant of the League of Nations231 did not
prohibit the resort to war, but contained a set of rules
that were at least, legally binding and codified provided a
limitation of the right to start wars. Worth mentioning is
the three month "cooling-off period" and the dispute
settlement mechanism in Article 12 paragraph 1:
The Members of the League agree that if there should
arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a
rupture, they will submit the matter either to
arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they
agree in no case to resort to war until three month
after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the
Counc i1 .232
The provision probably closest to a prohibition of the
ius ad bellum was Article 10 paragraph 1 sentence 1,233
where the Covenant explicitly established explicitly the
principle of respecting the territorial integrity as an
obligation for the member States. Moreover, the Council as
an international organ had the right to impose on the
inflicted States certain means to undertake the effort to
settle the dispute by peaceful means. These achievements,
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however, were devaluated by Article IS, paragraph 7, which,
in case the Council failed to reach a unanimous agreement on
the report, reserved the parties the right to take "actions
as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of
right and justice. ,,234 According to Bert V. A. Roeling,
the Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain any
"ban on the use of force, [but] only some restrictions
before the road to war lay open. ,,235
An important turning point towards the attitude against
the right to resort to war, was the Multilateral Treaty for
Renunciation of War of 1928, better known under the name of
the foreign ministers of the United States of America and
the French Republic, who elaborated the treaty, the Kellogg-
Briand-Pact.236 The treaty was signed by all of the later
major powers of World War II, and finally counted 63
contracting States. The weak point of it was that the
treaty did not supply any enforcement mechanism. In
Article I, the signatory states for the first time declared
the waging of war unconditioned as contrary to the Law of
Nations:
The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the
names of their respective peoples that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one
another. 237
After the end of World War II, the United States
Delegation to the London Conference expressed their
intention to try individuals of the European Axis who
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operated at the high-pol icy-making level for waging war. The
Soviet Union, France and above all the Churchill Government
were skeptical, or even opposed this intention; the latter
one with the argumentation that "international law did not
recognize a crime of aggression. "238 Also France expressed
their concern because according to their opinion crimes
against peace were lex lata. 239 Nonetheless, Article 6 (a)
of the Charter of the IMT defined the crime against peace as
namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 240
It is unclear whether this formulation restricts the
scope ratione personea of crimes against peace. Without
further doubt, only Heads of State and members of the
policy-making level have the capacity to plan, prepare or
initiate war. Less clear are the notions "waging,"
"participation" or "conspiracy. "241 On grounds of the
principle of proportionality, these notions should be
interpreted that they do not cover the participation of
every normal soldier in situations of war. 242 This view is
disputed243 but supported by Article 2 of the IMT according
to which only the "major war criminals" shall be prosecuted.
The United States Military Tribunal applied this
interpretation in the German High Command Trial244 and I.G.
Farben Trial.245 The wording of Article 5 of the Charter
of the IMT for the Far East is substantially identical.
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Article 2, paragraph 1 (a), of Control Council Law Number
la, which gave the legal basis for the trials executed by
other tribunals than the IMT added the above given
definition the passage" [i]nitiation of invasions of other
countries and wars of aggression in violation of
international laws and treaties, including .... ,,~6
One specific legal problem of crimes against peace was
the defense of the accused that this actus reus247 did not
exist prior World War II in international law. Thus, the
trial would violate the principles "nullum crimen sine leqe"
and "nulla poene sine leqe." The IMT rejected this defense
and stated that the Charter contained "the expression of
international law existing at the time of its creation. ,,248
The Tribunal primarily relied on the Kellogg-Briand of
1928.249 This document contained the first unconditioned
condemnation of war. The Pact was legally binding and
contained a clear prohibition. Without success the
defendants invoked "that the Pact does not specifically
state that aggressive war is a crime. ,,250 Further
reference gave the Tribunal to the Geneva Protocol for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1924.
However, Germany did not sign this resolution because it was
not yet member of the League of Nations. In October, Germany
withdrew from the Covenant of the League of Nations. Hence,
it is more than questionable that the German Reich binding
conventional international law provided a crime against
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peace. A different approach is to qualify aggression as
violation of customary international law. Indeed, there is
also the mentioned articles of the Charter of the League of
Nations, the Pacific Settlement Protocol and the Pact as
further proof of documents outlawing aggression. 251
Nonetheless, one may doubt whether these sources were
consistent enough to fulfill the requirements of existing
customary international law after the end of World
War 11.252
Even if one agrees that the actus reus of prohibition
of aggression was existing international customary law at
the end of World War II, most commentators253 agree that
the opinion of the IMT that the Charter of the IMT expresses
only existing international law fall short of proof, at
least concerning the individual responsibility. One of the
references the IMT gave was the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This
argument is not convincing. Beside the already mentioned
objections, the scope ratione personae, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact only addressed the states. Furthermore, the IMT cites
in support of its view other documents, 254 which outlaw
aggressive war as international crime. But none of them
established any individual responsibility of human
beings.255 Hence, individual responsibility was neither
part of the existing international law nor customary
international law prior to World War II.
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2.2. Current Legal Situation
Saddam Hussein invaded Liesoy in August of 1990. Is he
individually responsible for the commitment of a crime
against peace under current valid international law? Three
issues should be addressed in order to give a satisfactory
answer: (1) whether a crime exist against peace as part of
international law, (2) if yes, what is the definition, the
actus reus and, finally, (3) does international law provide
individual responsibility of the perpetrator.
Crime Against Peace as Part of International Law
A prerequisite to affirming the existence of a crime
against peace is that, first, that the norm is part of -
binding - international law. And, second, that the actus
reus of this norm reflects one or more of the penal
characteristics. As we saw, prior to World War II crimes
against peace were neither part of conventional and probably
not customary international law. 256 For the current legal
situation, thus, it is decisive if "crimes against peace"
emerged as new rule of international law, either as part of
conventional or customary international law.
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United
Nations implemented the idea of the Kellogg-Briand-Pact with
the extension that nowadays any form of use of force is
prohibi ted except self -defense. 257 Under Chapter VI I, the
Security Council has the competence to issue, in particular,
economic258 and military259 sanctions for the restoration
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of peace. Other binding instruments do not exist. However,
under consideration of the universal applicability of the
Charter and the prevailing nature of the Charter over other
instruments of international law,260Article 2, paragraph
4, and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter are sufficient proof
that aggression is a criminal conduct and, therefore, an
international crime under international law.261 If
aggression is an international crime262 apart of the
Charter under customary international law is of minor
importance,263 because on the one hand nearly every
State264 is member of the United Nations. Furthermore,
Article 2, paragraph 6, of the U.N. Charter ensures that
non-members obey "these principles [of the Charter] so far
as it may be necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security. Consequently, the notion "jus ad bellum"
belongs to history. More adequate is to speak of the "jus
contra bellum,,265
As in the Draft of 1954, in the Draft of 1991, the ILC
goes even one step further in suggesting in Article 16266
that the mere threat of aggression should be an
international crime. This reflects that, in addition to
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United
Nations, U.N.G.A. Resolutions267 as well as the judgement
of the ICJ in the case Nicaraqua v. United States
(Merits)268outlaw "declarations, communications,
demonstrations of force,,269or other acts that constitute
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threats of aggression. However, several details of this
Article were disputed among the members of the ILC270and
it is questionable that such an enlargement will become
international law in the near future.
Definition of Aggression
Nuernberg introduced the term "war of aggression." One
of the major obstacles in the attempts of the ILC to
establish individual responsibility for crimes against peace
was the failure of a definition of the notion "aggression."
For this, and other reasons in 1954, the work of the ILC on
the Draft Code was postponed. 271In 1974, the UNGA
succeeded in adopting Resolution 3314,272 that defines the
notion of "aggression.,,273 Article 15, paragraphs 2 to 7,
of ILC Draft of 1991, largely reiterate the definitions of
U.N.G.A. Resolution 3314.274 The definition is divided in
an abstract part275 and an enumeration of a situation
constituting aggression. 276The most important situations
covered by the articles are invasion, bombardments,
blockades and the sending of irregular troops and armed
bands, "which carry out armed force against another
State. ,,277Paragraphs 6 and 7 "reproduce Articles 6 and 7
of the 1974 Definition of Aggression" and state that Article
15 does in no way alter the scope of the Charter of the
United Nations, especially with regard to the lawful use of
force under Chapter VII278 and the right of self-
determination. Under the light of the United Nations
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Charter large parts definition of aggression are relevant
for the actus reus of the crime against peace.
Individual Responsibility for the Crime Against Peace
Just as little individual responsibility was part of
international law prior World War II, Article 2, paragraph
4, of the U.N. Charter does not contain any obligation for
the individual human being, but addresses only States.
Consequently, individual responsibility for crimes against
peace is at present not part of conventional international
law. Disputed is whether customary international law
provides today responsibility of the individual for the
crime against peace. A remarkable number of international
documents after World War II deal with crimes against peace.
Nuernberg Principle VI (a)279 of the ILC of 1950280
repeated the wording of Article 6(a) of the Charter of the
IMT. Furthermore, several United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions express that the desire and necessity of the
community of States for individual responsibility. In
Resolution 95 (I) the General Assembly affirmed the
principle of individual responsibility. Resolution 2625
(XXV), that was adopted by consensus that "[a] war of
aggression constitutes a crime against peace for which there
is responsibility under international law. ,,281 A similar
formulation contains Article 5, paragraph 2, of Resolution
3314.282 Article 12 and 13 of new ILC Draft of 1991
continue this efforts. One objection to the existing
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customary international law is that "not one of the
approximately 30 [and more] international wars that have
taken place since 1945 has resulted in a prosecution for
crimes against peace. ,,283If application is given to the
prerequisites of customary international law, "practice" and
"recognition as legally binding,,284then one merely can
support the assertion285 that customary international law
provides individual responsibility for "crimes against
peace. ,,286It remains hopeful that this will be one of the
next steps the international community is prepared to do.
3. War Crimes
In contrast to the issues of individual responsibility
and crimes against peace, conventional international law
supplies a comprehensive set of rules outlawing certain acts
committed in the conduct of hostilities against civilians
and against person hors de combat. For reasons of space in
this text, only the major sources of conventional and
customary international are mentioned and regarded:
1. Article 71 of the Lieber Code of 1863
2. Article 22, 23 The Hague Convention II of 1899 and
Convention IV of 1907.
3. Article 228 of Peace Treaty of Versaille, 28 June 1919
4. Declaration of St. James
5. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis. Signed at
London, on 8 August 1945
6. Article 6 (b) of the IMT Charter
7. Control Council Law No. 10, 20 December 1945
8. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law
Recognized by the Charter of the Nuernberg Tribunal
(G.A.-Res. 3(I) of 11 December 1946
9. Genocide-Convention, 1948
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10. Grave Breaches: Article 50 of Convention I, Article 51
of Convention II, Article 130 of Convention III and
Article 147 of Convention IV of Geneva of 1949
11. Principles of International Law Recognized by the
Charter of the Nuernberg Tribunal (G.A.-Res.95 (I) of
1950)
12. Draft Code of the ILC: Crimes against Peace and Security
of Mankind, 1954
13. Article 28 Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954
14. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,
26 November 1968
15. U.N. Resolution 2712 on War Criminals, 15 December 1970
16. European Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity, 25 January 1974
17. Article 85 paragraph 3 and 11, 85 paragraph 4 (a)-(e),
85 paragraph 3 (a)- (f) (see ILC-Draft at 273: 85 and 57
paragraph 2 (a) (iii), 85 paragraph 4 (d) and 53 of
Additional Protocol I
18. Article 4 paragraph 2 and 13 paragraph 2 of 1977
Additional Protocol II
19. Article 22 of ILC Draft Code of 1991
20. Article 6 of the French Report
21. Article 4 of the Italian Report
22. Article 3 of the CSCE Report
3.1. History and Legal Development
Regulations that address the committing of war crimes
by members of armed forces can be traced back in history up
to 500 B.C. and are found in all geographical regions287 More
recently, for the United States, relevant examples are
Articles 47 and 71 of the Lieber Code, 288 that outlawed acts
IIpunishable by all penal codesll289 of American soldiers
against civilian populations of the enemy and additional
wounding or killing of soldiers IIhors de combat. IIIt is
striking that the protected persons are identical to two
groups also protected in the Geneva Law, the civilian
population and soldiers IIhorsde combat. II The Hague
Convention II of 1899 and Convention IV of 1907 contain
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regulations that prohibit certain methods of warfare like
treachery, killing of those who have surrendered, abuse of
flags and unnecessary destruction of private property and
seizure of religious and municipal property.290 The
qualification that prohibited conduct is one of the
characteristics of a crime. Consequently, these norms
constitute war crimes. In the inter-war period Article 228
of the Peace Treaty of Versaille provided that
[t]he German Government recognizes the right of the
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military
tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in
violations of the laws of war and customs of war.291
Yet, in a note of February 16, 1920, the Allies
declined their right to exercise their extradition claim and
agreed that the German Supreme Court at Leipzig should try
the accused. The judgement of the perpetrators of war crimes
was based on German municipal law. Therefore, this episode
did not contribute to the development of war crimes under
international law. The Nuernberg Trials292 tried to prevent
the experience of Leipzig. Article 6 (b) of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, a combination between
an abstract definition and reference to the enumeration
principle, defined of the actus reus of "war crimes" as
namely, violations of the laws and customs of war.
Such violation shall include, but not be limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessitYi293
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The first sentence reveals that the judgement of the
IMT on war crimes should be based on existing conventional
and customary international and is insofar no new sources of
law. The second sentence, then, gives a list of acts
constituting war crimes. It is important to mention, first,
that it is an open, nonconclusive enumeration, and, second,
that the scope ratione personae, which is protected, are the
PoW and the civilian population. Public and private
property are also protected. However, the scope of
enumerated forbidden acts was restricted very narrow.
Moreover, the scope ratione temporis was restricted to war
crimes committed during the course of World War II.
The significance of Nuernberg with regard to war crimes
is to a lesser extent the scope of the described war crimes
rather than "the general recognition of criminal
responsibility for serious violations of the laws of war and
in the duty of States to prosecute or extradite accused
persons .... "294 Furthermore it was the driving experience
that led to the most important current valid instruments
that address war crimes, the Genocide Convention of 1948 and
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Before we address the
different instruments one can summarize and define war
crimes as all acts which constitute grave violations of the
Laws of War that are applicable in the course of hostilities
("conduite des hostilities") against belligerent, the
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citizens or property of the enemy or of a conquered nation
or of a forcibly occupied neutral territory. 11295
3.2. Current Legal Situation
a. Conventional Law
If we regard the current valid international
instruments, two set of rules may be regarded as the
paramount of existing treaty law outlawing war crimes: The
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of
1977296 and the Genocide Convention of 1948. Both the
Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention were inspired
by the atrocities in World War II and are today universally
accepted.297 The overwhelming maj ori ty of states are
contracting parties. In the current efforts of the Security
Council to establish a tribunal for the war crimes committed
in the territory of former Yugoslavia, reference is made to
both of these basic instruments.
(1) The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols
of 1977
The actus reus, indirect individual responsibility is
established for, can be found in Article 50 of Convention I,
Article 51 of Convention II, Article 130 of Convention III
and Article 147 of Convention IV. Additional Protocol 1298
contains war crimes in Articles 11 and 85. Whether
Additional Protocol II contains war crimes is questionable.
Some commentators cite Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 13, and
paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol II as being similar to
the "grave breaches" of the four Geneva Conventions299
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nevertheless true that the word "crimes" had a different
2 common, i.e, conflicts of non-international character.304
"The
One has to differentiate between the general material
latter addresses victims of conflicts not covered by Article
"all cases of declared war or ...any other armed
that this term is only a synonYm for war crimes.
paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol II provides that the
international character. 303 Article I, paragraph 3, of
to the four Conventions, international armed conflicts.
was that it felt that, though such acts were described as
breaches" is used. However, commentators unanimously agree
Beside Article 3, common of the four Conventions Article I,
Additional Protocol I provides that this Protocol is
applicable under situations mentioned in Article 2, common
these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes. ,,301
the general protected group of persons. According to
that since 1977 Article 85, paragraph 5 of Additional
legal meaning in different countries. ,,300 This confirms
crimes in the penal laws of almost all countries, it was
Under the system of the Geneva law only the notion "grave
reason the Conference preferred the words "grave breaches"
Field of application of the Conventions and the Additional
Protocols
Protocol I states explicitly that "...grave breaches of
conflict .... ,,302 This includes only armed conflicts of an
Article 2, all four Geneva Conventions are applicable in
field of application as laid down in Article 2 common and
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The Conventions provide protection for war victims and
each one addresses to a different group of possible of them:
Convention I deals with "the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Convention
II dedicates to "the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed forces at Sea. For reasons of
significance and space we will restrict further
considerations to Convention III that deals with the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (PoW) and Convention IV that
provides rules for the protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War. What all four Conventions have in common is
that the protected persons are always at the power of the
enemy. The conflicts in Nigeria, the Middle East and
especially Vietnam in the 1960's revealed that beyond the
Geneva Conventions additional regulations "would be
necessary for the protection of the civilian population
against the effects of hostilities".30s Protocol I is, in
addition to the four Geneva Conventions, concerned with the
protection of combatants, civilians and dedicates special
protection to children.
Actus reus of grave breaches
Article 130 of Convention III
Acts that are within the described field of application
grave breaches involve the following five conducts:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of
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enumerate and reiterate the forbidden conducts laid down in
Convention III add two further criminal conducts
It is
the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of
war of its rights of fair and regular trial prescribed
in this Convention. 306
The protected persons under this norm are, as already
member of the enemy armed forces.
seen, the PoW. Article 4 provides a lengthy description who
may fall under this notion307 A Perpetrator may be any
...unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a protected person, ...taking hostages
and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly. 308
Article 147 of Convention IV
Besides the Genocide Convention, Article 130 of
Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Convention IV309
Acts that provide protection to the Civilian population
against the acts already mentioned in Article 130 of
provides in essence that protected persons are all
the Geneva Conventions. 311 Article 2, paragraph 1 (b), of
civilians, who are "not a national of the Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power in whose hands he is. "310
Convention III and Article 147 of Convention IV presumably
the crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, if it
becomes a reality, will rely for their judgements.
will be the major sources on which a Tribunal dealing with
Tribunal shall made reference to the Geneva Conventions or
still unsolved is whether the Statute of the prospective
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acts shall be tried be the Tribunal:
A reason for this restriction was the fear of the
Violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, and cruel treatment such as
torture, mutilation or any kind of corporal
punishment;
Collective punishment;
Taking hostages;
Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, forced
prostitution and indecent assault;
[omitted]
Extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
piunder. ,,312
(i)
(v)
(vi)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(vii)
However, these conducts are only punishable by the
and Article 3 common when it provides that the following
the French recommendations for a Statute of the Tribunal
combines Article 130 of Convention III, 147 of Convention IV
to function effectively.313 The application of the Geneva
Tribunal if they were massive and systematic.
would be submerged "in so many cases that it would be unable
Committee that otherwise the international jurisdiction
the conflict are bound.3M Problems, however, could arise
Army intervened in Croatia. The Croatian declaration of
from the scope temporis. On July 3,1991, just about five
succession to the Geneva Conventions was made on May 11,
former Yugoslavia without further problem. All parties in
weeks after the declaration of independence, 315the Federal
1992. Hence the question arises if Croatia was bound to the
Conventions and Protocols as such is in the case of the
Geneva Conventions between July 3, 1991 and May 11, 1992.
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The same issue arises for Bosnia and Herzegowina between the
outbreak of clashes between Serbian and Muslim militias on 1
April 1992, one month after the referendum on independence,
and the Bosnian declaration of succession on December 31,
1992.
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegowina could argue that
between these periods they were not bound by the Geneva law.
With regard to Bosnia and Herzegowina, another problem could
arise from Article 2 common of the Geneva Conventions. On
May 22, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegowina were admitted as member
of the United Nations. From this point of time the quality
as to a State is without question. It is unclear, however,
if Bosnia and Herzegowina fulfilled the prerequisites of an
State. The Bosnian Government had never effectively
controlled the majority of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegowina.
Furthermore, indeed, muslims are the major ethnic group
in Bosnia and Herzegowina,316 yet nearly 50 percent of the
population are Serbs and Croats. In such a case, can people
be considered? If these prerequisites are denied, then in
the period before membership in the United Nations, only a
civil war was in existence with the consequence that only
Additional Protocol II was applicable. In this case the
interesting, but unresolved, issue arises whether the United
Nations Security Council has, under Chapter VII, the
competence to enlarge the applicability of the Geneva
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Conventions and Additional Protocol I to a situation of a
non-international conflict. Can this be justified under the
restoration of international peace and security? These
issues are still unsolved.
Article 11 and 85 paragraph 3 (a)-(f), paragraph 4 (a)-(e)
of Additional Protocol I
Additional Protocol I provides three sections in which
grave breaches are laid down: Article 11, Article 85,
paragraph 3 (a)-(f), paragraph 4 (a)-(e). The intention of
these provisions is to accomplish and enlarge the protection
of the groups of war victims protected by the four
Conventions of 1949. Article 11, whose violation is
according to Article 85, paragraph 3, a grave breach of
Protocol I, has the "the foremost aim ...to clarify and
develop the protection of persons protected by the
Convention and the Protocol against medical procedures not
indicated by their state of health, and particularly against
unlawful medical experiments. ,,317 Moreover, physical
mutilations, scientific experiments and the removal of
tissue or organs for transplantation are in particular
prohibited. 318 Article 85, paragraphs 3 and 4, provides an
enumeration of acts that are concerned with conduct of
warfare, and, therefore belong to the Hague Law. The new
quality of these norms is that not only against persons or
objects in the power of the enemy war crimes can be
committed and tried, but also conduct committed in the
course of hostilities, i.e., on the battlefield. Article 85,
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paragraph 3, for e.g., includes attacks on civilian
population, on persons "hors de combat" and the use of the
red cross emblem without authorization. The threshold for
all enumerated acts is that they must be executed "wilfully"
and cause "death or serious injury to body or health".
Article 85, paragraph 4, deals with apartheid methods,
delayed repatriation, destruction of clearly recognized
historic monuments and transfer of its own population into
occupied territory or deporting of population of the
occupied territory out of the latter. All acts require
intention. Protected Persons are, according to Article 85,
paragraphs 2, 44, and 45, combatants (wearing uniform), PoW
and children.
Article 4 paragraph 2 and 13 paragraph 2 of Additional
Protocol II
Some authors take the view that also Article 4,
paragraphs 2 and 13, belong to the category of war
crimes.319 Both Articles prohibit certain conducts such as
violence to life, acts of terrorism and spread of terrorism
among the civilian population. Therefore, it belongs to
international criminal law. Whether they are defined as war
crimes depends on what application is given to the notion
"war," i.e., the issue of whether war covers only
international conflicts or includes non-international
conflicts.320 The general tendency among scholars321 as
well as in the ILC322 is to abolish the distinction between
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international and non-international conflicts for the system
of war crimes. However, this view is disputed.
(2) Protection of (Cultural) Property323
The intense destruction of public, private, non-
cultural and cultural property in the conflict in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia, gives reason to
investigate if existing rules of law prohibit these
conducts. Prior to World War II, only a small amount of
evidence is available for the special protection of cultural
property. One of the first instruments addressing it was the
Roerich Pact of 1935.324 After World War II, more attention
was given to cultural valuable object. Rules dealt with
later can be divided into two groups: Regulations
protecting civilian property and regulations protecting
cultural sites and historic monuments.
Article 85, paragraph 3 (b), and Article 57, paragraph
2 (a) (iii), of Additional Protocol I provide the obligation
to damage civil objects only to the minimum degree and
prohibit any further destruction. The term "minimum"
however, is quite slippery. Article 147 of Geneva
Convention IV outlaws the "extensive destruction and
appropriation of property [if the act is] not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly. ,,325 The scope of this provision is very broad and
includes any kind of property: private, public, or cultural,
whether valuable or not. However, the triple restriction of
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military unnecessary, unlawful and wanton execution of the
destruction takes much of its effectiveness from this
provision. Restricted to cultural private or public
property, but without the restriction of Article 147 of
Geneva Convention IV, The Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property is one of the most
comprehensive instruments for the protection of monuments
and historical and cultural works of Article 1.326 Article
1 (a) protects, among other things:
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether
religious or secular; archeological sites, groups of
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or
artistic interest; 327
In the course of the war cultural sites like the
historical town of Dubrovnik, several mosque in Bosnia and
Herzegowina suffered severe destruction. The French Report
decided to adopt under the crimes within the jurisdiction of
the prospective Tribunal crimes in the territory of former
Yugoslavia Article 147 of Convention IV. 328 The advantage
of Article 147 is that it covers cultural and non-cultural
property. However, under Article 147 of the Geneva
Convention IV it would be presumably difficult to disprove
the defense that the destruction was induced by military
necessity. Therefore, it is doubtful as to whether the
French Proposal will prove to be a sufficient tool.329
Therefore, it is important that these acts are covered by
the Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property. The
parties involved in the conflict in the territory of the
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former Yugoslavia are bound by the Convention. 330 Article
4, paragraph I, prohibits "any acts of hostility directed
against such property" whereby it is without difference if
the cultural site is located within or without the own
territory. Paragraph 4 adds that the High Contracting
Parties "shall refrain from any act directed by ways of
reprisal against cultural property."
The Convention does not provide any direct individual
responsibility for breaches of the obligations laid down
above, however, orders alike the Geneva Conventions the
obligation to implement and prosecute breaches of the
obligations by means of municipal law.331In contrast to
the Geneva Convention, the principle of try or extradite is
not adopted. The special protection of cultural sites has
been a part of the Geneva Law since 1977. Article 85,
paragraph 4 (d), of Additional Protocol I prohibits making
objects of cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples object
of attacks. However, the application of this provision
contains a fivefold threshold. Protected are only historic
monuments that are "clearly recognized" as such and "to
which special protection has been given by special
arrangement." The protected monument must be located
outside the "immediate proximity of military objectives" and
must not be used "in support of the military effort,,332of
the adversary. Finally, the destruction must be extensive.
In the conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia, the
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defendants would say that any destroyed historic site
fulfilled all of the of requirements. Indeed, the scope of
Article 53 of Additional Protocol I is broader because it
prohibits hostilities against any historic monuments which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of people.
Because of the prohibition of the conduct one may qualify
this provision as war crime,333 however, it is not part of
the "grave breaches" and, therefore, no (indirect)
individual responsibility exists.
b. Customary International Law
One may ask why it is·at all important that war crimes
are part of customary international law. Indeed, the Geneva
Conventions are ratified by the majority of States.
Nevertheless there are situations where these Conventions
cannot be applied. As already indicated, in non-
international conflict the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I
are not applicable. Does customary international provide
regulations that defines acts in non-international conflicts
as war crimes? Furthermore, many States like the United
States have not ratified Protocol I. Are they bound to the
provisions of Protocol I on grounds of customary
international law? Another example may be the transitional
periods of Bosnia and Herzegowina and Croatia between their
statehood and declarations of succession to the Geneva Law.
Hence, here also the question arises whether the new States
in the territory of former Yugoslavia are bound on the
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prohibitions laid down in Article 2 on grounds of customary
law.
In 1948, UNWCC filed in 1948 a list of war crimes that
covers 32 different acts. The commission of these acts
constitute "breaches of the laws and customs of war
according to the UNWCC. "334 The accepted view is that
Article 3, which is common to the four Conventions, belongs
to the" [w]ell-established general rules of customary
law .... "335 Moreover, there is the tendency to include the
"grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions III and IV. This
is because they are partly identical with the actus reus of
Article 3 common and Article 6 (b) of the IMT. The latter
provision, that protects PoW and the civilian population,
was undisputed at the end of World War II when there was
already existing customary international law for
international conflicts. 336
Furthermore, the actus reus of "war crimes" was
confirmed in the post war period in several instruments and
documents. But also to the extent that the "grave breaches"
of the Conventions enlarge Article 3 common and Article 6
(b) of the Charter of the IMT (i.e. the prohibition of acts
like biological experiments, compelling a protected person
to serve in the force of a hostile Power and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property) the "grave
breaches" today probably can be regarded as customary
law.337
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c. Article 22 of the ILC Draft of 1991
Article 22 supplies the actus reus for war crimes that
should be covered by the Draft. The present article reflects
a compromise between different attitudes between the members
of the ILC. Paragraph 2, sentence I, contains a general
definition, whereas Article 2 enumerates the different acts
covered by the Draft.338 Some features make it worth
dealing in a larger extent with this part of the draft.339
What is the new quality of this article beside the law
of Geneva and customary international law that prohibit war
crimes? In contrast to the Geneva Law of the four
Conventions and customary international law the actus reus
is restricted to exceptionally serious war crimes. This
means a double threshold. Not all war crimes are covered,
only the serious war crimes,34o and among the serious war
crimes, again, only the exceptionally serious will be
covered by the present Article. In the commentary, the ILC
explicitly states that the mentioned Article should not
cover "all war crimes in the traditional sense, nor are they
all grave breaches [of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I] ...."341From the text of the draft it remains
ambiguous if all acts mentioned under paragraph 2 (a) to (f)
constitute automatically exceptionally serious war crimes.
The text of the draft seems to support this interpretation.
However the ILC states that the following three conditions
have to be fulfilled:
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(a) "...the act constituting a crime falls within any
one of the six categories on paragraph 2 (a) to (f);
(b) ...the act is a violation of principles and rules
of international law applicable in armed conflicts;
(c) ...the violation is exceptionally serious. ,,342
This passage clarifies that not all under paragraph 2 (a) to
(f) mentioned acts are automatically exceptional serious,
but only those of the described acts of para 2 (a) to (f)
that were committed with special excessiveness or intensity.
Already existing war crimes or grave breaches remain
applicable international law. Article 22 does not replace
the existing system but broadens the scope of individual
responsibility for war crimes. Under this diffuse
definition, it is helpful that according to the commentary
the enumeration under paragraph 2 is "exhaustive,,343and
not open ended. Already existing war crimes in
international law that will not be covered remain untouched.
Of further interest is that paragraph 2 refers for the
enumerative definition on conventional or customary
international law. However, it is important to keep in mind
that the acts thereunder prescribed need not be part of
existing war crimes under international law. Instead it is
sufficient that the act is an exceptionally serious
violation of "principles and rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict." What the significance of this
79
unclear. It should be helpful for later interpretation of
different acts defined thereunder.
The enumerated types of conduct under paras. (a) (f)
partly reiterate The Hague Law and the Law of Geneva, partly
contain new conducts, that reflect new means of warfare in
recent conflicts. Para. (a) is substantial identical with
Article 3 which is common to the Geneva Conventions and
Article 147 of Convention IV,344 but has no restrictions
with regard to its scope of persons who are protected. Sub-
paragraph (c) outlaws the unlawful use of weapons as already
reflected in the existing Hague Law. 345 The intent of the
ILC under subparagraph (b) to qualify the establishment of
settlers in an occupied territory is not part of existing
international criminal law. The ILC reasoned the adoption of
this provision with the argument "that such an act could
involve the disguised intent to annex the occupied
territory. "346 It is doubtful as to whether this rule will
survive the comments and recommendations of States. If this
provision became part of conventional international law, the
Prime Minister, the Government and military commanders of
Israel could be accused of war crimes. The State of Israel
has been practicing this policy for years in the Gaza Strip.
Besides Article 26, subparagraph (d) prohibits conduct that
causes widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment. The wording is taken from Article 35,
paragraph 3, and Article 55 of Additional Protocol I. The
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prohibition of the conduct in these articles indicates that
they are part of international criminal law. However, they
may be war crimes under international law. Article 85 of
Additional Protocol I does not cite both of them, and, under
the system of the Geneva law only "grave breaches" are
considered as war crimes that the Contracting Parties are
obliged to try or prosecute. Whether this omission takes
Articles 35, paragraphs 3 and 55, the quality of crimes
under the laws of war, or only provides indirect individual
responsibility, is not completely clear.
Under either possibility, however, one comes to the
solution that neither conventional nor customary
international law provides for individual responsibility for
conduct like the order of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussain in
the course of the Kuwait conflict to pollute the Gulf with
hundreds of thousands of tons of oil. The proof that such
conduct becomes more likely to be used as a mode of warfare,
however, reveals the desirability of creating an instrument
that qualifies actions like this as war crimes and to
provide individual responsibility for them. Property is
protected by subparagraph (e) and (f). The former covers
"large-scale destruction of civilian property," that has to
be interpreted alike its conventional models, Article 147 of
Geneva Convention IV, Article 85 paragraph 3 (b) and (c) and
Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii), of Additional Protocol I.
For the protection of cultural property in sub-paragraph (f)
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the ILC tries to approach to Article 53 of Additional
Protocol I and to renounce the manifolded prerequisites laid
down in Article 85, paragraph 4 (d), of the Protocol.
Instead, the draft article concentrates on two elements that
restrict the applicability: the wilful character and the
exceptional religious, cultural or historic value of the
property.
The revolutionary innovation in Article 22 is the
extension of the notion "armed conflict." Under current
international law347 the notion "armed conflict" covers
only international conflicts, i.e, conflicts between two
states or a war of national liberation. According to the
commentary
the words "armed conflict" cover not only
international armed conflicts within the meaning of
Article I, paragraph 4, of Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions but also non-international armed
conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the four 1949
Geneva Conventions. 348
Here, the ILC considers the increasing attitude among
scholar and commentators that for an effective protection of
the victims of all armed conflict humanitarian law must
provide individual responsibility for international as well
as non-international conflicts. For the scope of the Draft
the distinction between the different kind of conflicts is
abandoned. It cannot be sufficiently stressed: The
improvement of the situation for victims of non-
international conflicts would be enormous if this text once
became binding international law.
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4. Crimes Against Humanity349
The notion of crimes against humanity is ambiguous and
not easy to define. The term was first used in early 1800
"by European Powers to condemn Turkey for certain genocidal
massacres of the Christian minority and to justify
humanitarian intervention by these European States ....
[This] was a political solution unsupported by any norm of
international law. ,,350 In the context of an international
legal document the notion of humanity was first used in the
Conference at The Hague. Since then there are instruments
and documents available. Nowadays the term of crimes
against humanity is mostly replaced by the Genocide and
Apartheid Convention. Furthermore, this is covered in
Article 50 of Geneva Convention I and in Article 51 of
Geneva Convention II. Article 130 of Geneva Convention III
and Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV include the most
heinous acts against humanity:
1. The Hague Convention II of 1899
2. The Hague Convention IV of 1907
3. Article 6 (c) of the IMT-Charter
4. Genocide Convention
5. Article 50 of Geneva Convention I, Article 51 of Geneva
Convention II, Article 130 of Geneva Convention III and
Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV
6. Principle 6 (c) of the Nuernberg Principles
7. Article 2 paragraph 10-12 of the ILC Draft of 1954
8. Article 19 of the ILC Draft of 1991
9. Article 6 of the French Report
10. Article 4 of the Italian Report
11. Article 3 of the CSCE Report
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for the first time in Article 6 (c) of the Charter of the
The Hague Convention II of 1899 and Convention IV of
The norm was with respect to its controversy more
Crimes against humanity as part of treaty law appears
The relationship between crimes against humanity, on
[c]rimes against humanity: namely, murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or prosecution on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country were perpetrated.
4.1. Legal and Historical Development
1907 announce in their preamble that in cases where the
Convention is not applicable "belligerent remain under the
protection and empire of ... the laws of humanity ...."351
massacres of the Armenian minority living in Turkey, an
During World War I the Turkish Government ordered the
event that was later called "the forgotten genocide. "352
against humanity in that the Turkish officials were
elementary laws of humanity"3~ failed because of the
IMT.
Great Britain and other European States condemned as crimes
the one hand, and crimes against peace and war crimes, on
the other hand, is ambiguous. Crimes against humanity are
UNWCC to punish the perpetrators for crimes against "the
personally responsible. 353 However, early attempts of the
disputed than war crimes and less disputed than crimes
obj ection of the United States. 355
against the peace. Article 6 (c) provides that
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not independent of war crimes or crimes against peace, yet
are not wholly part of either category. ,,356 The IMT
stressed that they were closely linked to the other both
categories of crimes covered by Article 6 of the Charter of
the IMT. Partly the actus reus is identical with war
crimes, however, crimes against humanity should also cover
acts that did not constitute war crimes either (1) because
they were committed before World War II or (2) because they
were committed during World War II but not in the conduct of
hostilities.357 It was important that the formulation
"civilian population" covered not only atrocities against
the population of adversaries in the war, but also the
German population that was subject to prosecution during the
Third Reich. 358
4.2. Current Legal Situation
Under current international law, crimes against
humanity are partly covered by the Genocide and Apartheid
Conventions and furthermore by the Geneva Law. The Genocide
Convention is applicable in time of peace as well as in time
of war. For the act of Apartheid, two set of rules are
available. The Apartheid Convention prohibits acts of
Apartheid in time of peace. 359 In the laws of war,
Apartheid is covered by the Geneva law. If, and to what
extent, crimes against humanity belong apart of these
instruments to current customary international law is
questionable.
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a. Genocide36o
Conventional International Law
Under the affect of the "Nazi holocaust in Europe that
slaughtered some 6 million Jews, 5 million Protestants, 3
million Catholics and half a million Gypsies,,361before and
during World War lIon 9 December 1948 the United Nations
General Assembly adopted unanimously by Resolution 260 (III)
A the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
crime of Genocide. 362 It was inspired by crimes against
humanity as laid down in the Charter of the IMT.363
Meanwhile, more than 100 States have ratified the
Convention364 and it is today one of the few universal
applicable instruments beside the Geneva Conventions. This
author is aware that "the Genocide Convention does not
constitute a part of the law of armed conflicts in its
strict sense ,,365because Article 1 confirms that Genocide
is a crime under international law "whether committed in
time of peace or in time of war ....,,366However, this
instrument gains particular importance in time of war and
may, therefore, for the purpose of this investigation, be
considered under the Chapter "Crimes under the Law of
Wars. ,,367
Article 1 states that Genocide is an international
crime, Article 5 obliges the Contracting Parties to
implement the acts of Genocide into municipal law. Article
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2 defines the following acts as Genocide, which the
Contracting Parties are obliged to prosecute and punish368:
In the present convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group. 369
This definition raises two major problems. First, since
the drafting of the Convention there are discussions about
the significance and content of the formulation "committed
with the intend to destroy, in whole or in Article ..."
Debated is, whether the phrase "in whole or in part" refers
to the commitment or to the intention. In the latter case
the perpetrator must kill at least parts of a group with the
intention to destroy the whole group. Suppose one prefers
this interpretation than the questions arises, what is a
group. If one follows the former interpretation that the
intention to destroy a part of a group is sufficient.
Suppose one follows this interpretation and questions arise
as to whether it is sufficient to kill one member of the
group for Genocide. 370
Bassiouni requires as a mental element the intent to
destroy the group as such.371 This author tends to adopt
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the interpretation of Ben Whitaker, rapporteur of the 1985
United Nations report on the Convention.372 First,
Whitaker clarifies that the crime of Genocide does not
require the elimination of a whole group; a part of it is
sufficient. With regard to the issue, what a part is,
Whitaker answers that" [i]n part would seem to imply a
reasonable significant number, relative to the total of the
group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group
such as its leadership. ,,373 He rejects the opinion of M.
Cherif Bassiouni 374 that the killing of a single member of
a group can constitute Genocide for two reasons. The
principle of gravity inherent the Convention "should not be
devaluated or diluted by the inflation of cases as a result
of too broad interpretation .... ,,375 This view is supported
by the language of Article 2 (a) and (e), which uses the
plural. Another problem that arises from the requirement of
the subjective element of "intent" is the difficulty to give
evidence for this prerequisite. One solution that has been
suggested was that "actions or omissions of such a degree of
criminal negligence or recklessness that .the defendant must
reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequence
of his conduct ,,376 are sufficient evidence.
The second major problem is what groups are protected.
Article 2 enumerates "national, ethnical, racial or
religious group". However, the Convention does not provide
any definition of these terms. Disputed is, among others,
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as to what extent the "national" or "ethnical" groups should
include sexual minorities. 377 One set of groups that are
not listed in the Convention, but are proposed by several
authors,378 are political groups. The original Article 2 of
the Ad hoc Committee's Draft enumerated, not only racial,
national and religious, but also political groups as
protected groups under the Convention. General Assembly
Resolution 96 (I) of 1946 still mentioned political groups
as subjects of persecution. One of the major supporters of
this definition was the United States.
However, during the work of the 1LC on the Convention
the majority of members and States voted to exclude this
group from the actus reus for political and legal reasons.
First, a number of States would have denied ratification of
the Genocide Convention including political groups.
Besides, the extension of the actus reus to political groups
would have caused considerable uncertainty when and whether
this would get in conflict with the principle of Non-
interference in domestic political affairs. Finally, it was
criticized that "political groups were not clearly
identifiable. "379 Furthermore, whether cultural genocide
should be included or whether genocide should be restricted
to physical destruction was debated. Whereas the Draft of
the Ad Hoc Committee of the ECOSOC contained a provision
dealing with the issue, the "majority [of representatives of
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States], however, considered that the protection of culture
should be object to another convention. ,,380
Despite the existence of the Convention, several mass
killings occurred without any punishment of the
perpetrators. Recent examples are the prosecution of Kurds
and Shiits in Iraq (and Turkey) .381 Despite the defeat of
Saddam Hussain he remained able to kill thousands of Shiits
and Kurds. The world public was horrified, but neither
Saddam Hussain, the superior military commander who gave the
orders nor the subordinate soldiers were held responsible
for it. It was necessary to wait until the occurrence of
the mass killings in the course of the Serbian policy the
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to place
genocide on the agenda of an International Tribunal. The
Reports of France, Italy and the CSCE unanimously propose
including the crime of Genocide. 382
Customary International Law
Declarations of succession of the new States in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia, like for the Geneva law,
do not exist with regard to the Genocide Convention.
Moreover, there are countries like Angola that are not
parties to the Convention. Hence, the question arises
whether the principles laid down in the Genocide Convention
are applicable in Angola on grounds of customary
international law. Since World War II a number of documents
reiterated that prohibition of Genocide. 383 According to
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the holding of the advisory opinion of the ICJ of May 28,
1951, "[t]he principles underlying the Convention are
principles which are recognized by civilian nations as
binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation. ,,384 Hence, genocide is part of customary
international law and both parties in the conflict, the
UNITA as well as the Governments of Angola are bound to obey
the rules laid down in the Genocide Convention. 385 This
view was also taken by the ILC386 and the French Jurists in
their report. 387 With regard to the scope of Genocide
Article 19 of the ILC Draft, neither report enlarges the
notion to cultural genocide. In the literature, authors take
the view that "the destruction of a national linguistic,
religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group"
[should be] protected by the crime of Genocide. 388 However,
this view could not find a majority in the ILC. The formal
argument they put forward was that the Draft should be
restricted to the most "heinous crimes." Moreover at the
current level States do not support any enlargement in this
direction.
bb. Apartheid and other for.ms of inhuman treatment
Conventional Law
The Geneva law refers in several provisions to
apartheid and other acts that the Charter of Nuernberg drew
under crimes against humanity. Article 147 of Convention IV
provides that "inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
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injury to body or health,389 unlawful deportation or
transfer" are grave breaches of the Convention. Because of
the events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia special
consideration deserves the prohibition of deportations.
Article 49, paragraph 2, clarifies that every deportation is
prohibited unless "the security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand. ,,390 In particular,
the notion of imperative military reasons gives reason for
concern about the effectiveness of this provision. It will
depend on the court to interpret this defense in an
reasonable manner.
One of the weaknesses of Article 147 is that the
applicability of this provision is restricted to acts that
take place in partial or totally occupied territory.391
Consequently, atrocities on the own population and on
civilian in nonoccupied territories fall not within the
scope of Geneva Convention IV.
Article 85 of Additional Protocol I enlarges the
prohibition of deportations. Paragraph 4 (a) outlaws the
transfer of population of the occupying power into the
territory as well as the deportation of the population in
the occupied territory outside or within the occupied
territory insofar as Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV does
not provide an exception. Sub-paragraph (b) furthermore
ensures that the repatriation of PoW should be executed
without "unjustifiable delay. ,,392Finally "practices of
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apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices
involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial
discrimination" are prohibited. 393
This set of rules surely covers the policy of ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegowina. Surprisingly, the
Report of the French Jurists does not contain any of these
provision. According to their view, the policy of ethnic
cleansing should be covered by the Genocide Convention. 394
This author hesitates to confirm this view because none of
the conduct laid down in Article 2 of the Genocide
Convention covers the mere act of deportation of civilian
population as such. The Italian report and the report of
the CSCE followed a different path. They propose to include
in addition to the crimes of Genocide also crimes against
humanity. 395 Under this crime they include also
"deportation and forcibly transferring populations." This
approach, to me, seems to be more adequate to ensure that
the tribunal will be able to prosecute the policy of ethnic
cleansing in former Yugoslavia in its whole extent.
What happens when the Geneva Conventions are not
applicable. As we saw this may occur under various
situations. Either parties to the conflict are not bound
like in the transitional period in the dissolution of the
former Yugoslavia or the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I are not applicable because the fighting does not
constitute an international conflict in the sense of Article
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2 common to all four Conventions. Article 3 common does help
partly as far as a conduct may be qualified as "outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment. ,,396 Protocol II also provides some
protection against inhuman treatment. 397 However, none of
these provision refers explicitly to deportation and other
forms of transfer of the population in the occupied
territory. Most commentators take the view that at least the
content of article 6 (c) of the Charter of the IMT is since
World War II part of customary international law. 398 If
this opinion is followed, then acts like deportation and
enslavement are punishable. Whether the articles of the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I can be regarded
as customary international law remains questionable.
CHAPTER III
ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Instruments that order the prosecution and punishment
of the perpetrators are effective deterrents, in addition to
provisions that outlaw certain acts. However, it is a
weakness of international law in general that it does not
address the issues of enforcement of the law. This failure
is even more valid for the section of international criminal
law. The reason for this is the tendency of States to
consider every loss of competence as intrusion into their
Sovereignty. Whereas in political affairs the Security
Council has the competence as police-organ, there is no
juridical equivalent. Nevertheless, some provisions deserve
closer consideration:
1. Art. 49 of Geneva Convention I, art. 50 of
Convention II, art. 129 of Convention III and art.
146 of Convention IV
2. Art. 28 of Cultural Property Convention of 1954
3. Art. 6 of Genocide Convention
4. Draft International Criminal Code (Bassiouni)
5. ILA Queensland Resolution on International Criminal
Law
6. 9th. Report of Special Rapporteur to the ILC
7. French Report
8. Italian Report
9. CSCE Report
10. D.N.S.C. Resolution 808 (1993)
The provisions dealing with prosecution and punishment,
i.e., enforcement of the laws of war producing individual
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responsibility for crimes against the laws of war are rather
spare in international law. There are two ways of
enforcement, either by international organs or by national
organs.399 This manuscript will address only the provisions
that belong in the broader sense to the laws of war or
include at least the jurisdiction over violations of the
laws of war. 400
1. National Law Approach
The failure of an international criminal court for the
enforcement, i.e., prosecution and punishment of the
perpetrators of the laws of war was left to the individual
states. This national approach raises many problems, among
which are issues of jurisdiction. In traditional customary
international law, jurisdiction required certain links.
Most common were the following four: The crime occurred in
the territory of the state, the crime has impact on the
state, the perpetrator is a national of the state, and, the
victim is national of the state. However, in recent times
the principle of universal iurisdiction has won growing
significance. The Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol
are, in this context, the most famous examples. Article 49,
Paragraph 2 of Convention I, Article 50, paragraph 2 of
Convention II, Article 129, paragraph of Convention III and
Article 146, paragraph 2 of Convention IV provide in
sentence 1 that:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the
obligation to search for persons alleged to have
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committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
reqardless of their nationality before its own
courts.401
Similar provisions contain Article 28 of the Haque
convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict. Article 5 of the Genocide
Convention gives an optional solution and provides that the
perpetrators have to be prosecuted either by national or an
international penal tribunal.
It has been mentioned already402 that these provisions
constitute an obliqation for the High Contracting State.
This obligation, however, is not absolute because States
have the option of "try or extradite", i.e., the possibility
of handing over the perpetrator to another High Contracting
Party. This customary rule of international criminal law is
incorporated in sentence 2 of the relevant articles of the
Geneva Conventions. 403 It is important to mention that the
Geneva Conventions give the right to prosecute war criminal
without discrimination.4~ Hence, not only the victim
State is empowered and obligated to try war criminals of the
aggressor, but also the aggressor state has the right and
the obligation to try war criminals of the victim State.
The result of this national law approach, with regard
to the implementation of the Geneva law, has been until now
rather disappointing. Only few High Contracting Parties
have changed - or at least adequately ensured a sufficient
concordance of the actus reus of the municipal law and the
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grave breaches - their domestic legislation on the
subj ect .405 But the enforcement is not more satisfying.
Since 1945 numerous civil wars and other wars took place. In
the conflicts in Algeria, Korea, the Congo, Biafra,
Indonesia, and East Pakistan "no systematic effort to
investigate the charges or bring the accused to trial" took
place.406 This list of Telford Taylor, who was Associate
trial Counsel at the IMT of Nuernberg, may be continued with
examples like Afghanistan or the Gulf War between Iraq and
Iran. The reason is obvious: No country wants to try their
"good boys" for "certain irregularities" during the combat.
Probably the most famous exception was the trial on the My
Lai (accurately Son My) killings407 in March 1968, during
the Vietnam War, by courts of the United States against
members of the U.S. forces. 408 However, of the perpetrators
only a few were tried and only Lieutenant William Calley was
convicted. Like the Leipzig trial after World War I "the
criminal consequences of My Lai were 'almost farcical.' "409
2. International Courts, Tribunals and International
Criminal Court
One has to distinguish between international courts and
international arbitration tribunals that have the competence
to interpret international treaties, to settle disputes
between States or that may even adjudicate civil claims for
restoration of property, from international criminal courts
that have the competence to apply international or municipal
penal law and to convict individuals or a State on grounds
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of criminal law. Whereas, there are increasing examples for
the former, 410examples of international criminal tribunals
are few in history. This paper addresses criminal
tribunals.
Two basic issues arise in connection with the
establishment of an international criminal court (ICC).
Should there be a permanent criminal court or is it
sufficient, if in cases of excessive war crimes, ad hoc
tribunals are established? History provides only the latter
case. The disadvantages and dangers of ad hoc tribunals will
be shown under the materials for the IMT.411 A permanent
ICC could be established either as a new judicial
institution independent from the ICJ or as a chamber of the
existing ICJ after the revision of its Statute.4U
However, there are a lot of problems and issues that are
still not resolved. One question, for example, is the
relationship of an international criminal court and the
Security Council in the case of sanctions and in the case of
aggression.
2.1. History and Legal Development413
Prior to World War I there is proof for cases where war
crimes of enemy soldiers led to a trial of the perpetrators.
The legal basis of jurisdiction "derived from the customary
right of a belligerent to try enemy soldiers for war
crimes.,,4M These tribunals were not of an international
character as they consisted of members of the nation of the
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perpetrated soldiers. Probably one of the first lawyers who
intended and inspired the idea of an establishment of an
international organ for the repression of crimes against the
law of nations (droit des qens) was M. Moynier in 1872.
More than two decades later, in 1895, he elaborated his
ideas at the session of the Institute for International Law.
According to Stefan Glaser, 415 the first step towards the
realization of the ideas of M. Moynier was the creation of
an International Prize Court to judge "[t]he validity of
the capture of merchant ship or its cargo. ,,416 In 1920,
when the Permanent Court of International Justice was
created, the Belqian delegate and president of the committee
that was entrusted to draft the statute of the PCIJ, Baron
Descamps, started an initiative to establish a High Court of
Justice that would have jurisdiction over crimes against the
law of nations. This proposal, however, was dismissed as
premature.417
After World War I the Allied established a Commission
to elaborate the necessary provision to punish the German
authors of the War. The Commission on Responsibility of the
authors of the War drew the conclusion that" [t]he acts
which brought the war should not be ...made subject of
proceedings before a tribunal. ,,418 Robert Lansing and
James Brown Scott, representative of the United States, both
expressed that only municipal tribunals of the Head of State
have the authority to try the latter.419 Nevertheless, the
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commission concluded Article 227, paragraph 2,420 that
foresaw the establishment of a international military
tribunal to try the former German Emperor Wilhelm II.
Article 229, paragraph 1,421 ordered that the German war
criminals should be tried before the military tribunal of
the power which the victim was a national. In this case,
prosecution and punishment would be done by a municipal
court. An international tribunal for the trial was planned
only in the case of Article 229, paragraph 2:
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals
of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers
will be brought before military tribunals composed of
members of the military tribunals of the Powers
concerned ...422
Neither provision was ever enforced. Wilhelm II found
asylum in the Netherlands and German war criminals were
tried on grounds of municipal German law and because of
German public pressure the Allied agreed to the proposal of
the German government to try other German war criminals
before the German Supreme Court in Leipzig. However, the
result of the trials was what Jacques-Bernard Herzog called
"la parodie de justice de Leipzig. ,,423 In June 1922, the
Court proceeded without the victor States and disregarded
fundamental rules of procedure as "[i]n the vast majority of
cases there was no public hearing. ,,424 The result of the
trials was "that out of a total of 901 cases .... 888 accused
were acquitted or summarily dismissed, and only 13 ended in
a conviction; ,,425
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The IMTs for Nuernberq and Tokvo426 are the only
examples in history where an international organ tried
individuals for crimes under the law of war.427 In
addition to two International Military Tribunals there were
a number of trials and hearings before the national courts
and commissions of the United States, Great Britain,
Australia, France and other States.428 The United States
military commissions and tribunals alone tried 950 cases
with a total of 3,095 defendants. Never before had such a
large number of war criminals been convicted.429 One of
the reasons for the creation of international tribunals were
the experiences with the Leipzig Trials.
The Nuernberg Tribunal was established ad hoc on the
basis of the London Agreement and the Charter for the IMT.
A special proclamation of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers established the Tokyo Military Tribunal in
January of 1946.430 They were international, insofar as
they were formed from members of four different States.
Furthermore, the London Agreement, which was based on
Article 2 of the London Agreement, and was an integral part
with the Charter of the IMT, was signed by 19 other States.
However, the members of the Tribunal were nationals of only
the Allied States. The victor States, tried only war crimes
of members of the defeated powers. The international
character would have been more valuable if members of
neutral states or those of the defendants' nationalities had
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been integrated in these judicial bodies. So, suspicion
about the impartiality of the courts arose. 431 Looking
back, it seems that an international tribunal for the trial
of war criminals is only possible if there is an
unconditional surrender of one of the parties which are
engaged in war.
2.2. Early Efforts after Nuernberg
As we saw, the number of cases in which perpetrators of
the laws of war have been tried by international tribunals
is rather small. Except for the IMT of Nuernberg and Tokyo
in recent history, there are no other examples. Telford
Taylor called the trials "an episode in a century-old
sequence of human thought and endeavor. "432 The reasons for
this are manifold: the trial of war criminals by organs
other than the ones of the perpetrators' nationality is a
highly delicate matter in the public opinion of the
perpetrators' country. 433 Even more, States fear the
establishment of an permanent international criminal court
(PIIC) that would be an intrusion into their sovereignty as
States. Apart from this, no head of state feels very
comfortable with the idea of an international organ that
could try him for crimes.
Nevertheless, the criticism of the Nuernberg and Tokyo
Trials sharpened the awareness for the necessity of an PICC,
and scholars of most countries434 and institutions435
elaborated drafts for such a court. There is one argument
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that endorsed the interest on an international criminal
judicial organ: Only litheestablishment of an international
criminal court could ... provide the required objectivity and
impartiality in applying a criminal code, and without those
factors there could be no valid and lasting international
order. 11436
One of the first efforts after World War II can be
found in the Genocide Convention. Article 6 provides that
Persons charged with Genocide or any other acts
enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act
was committed, or by such international penal tribunal
as may have jurisdiction with respect to those
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction.437
This wording is rather unique and reflects the dispute
within the ILC as to whether there should be created an
international criminal court as "rule-supervisory organ"438
for the Genocide Convention. The strongest supporter of this
idea during the drafting of the convention439 was the
representative of the United States. The underpinning was
that history showed that States are not always willing to
try their nationals on charges of Genocide. The opponents,
especially the Soviet Union, relied on aspects of State
Sovereignty. After one vote in favor of deleting Article 6
and another vote where the members decided to reconsider the
content of the clause, the majority of States decided to
reinsert the provision pertaining to the possibility of an
prospective International Criminal Court. On a draft
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resolution of the ILC to continue its work for the creation
of such an organ, the General Assembly approved this and
[i]nvite[d] the International Law Commission to study
the desirability and possibility of establishing an
international judicial organ for the trial of
persons charged with genocide or other crimes over
which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by
international conventions. 440
Two possibilities were considered for the establishment
of an international criminal court. It could be either a new
institution or a chamber of the ICJ. Therefore, in the same
document the General Assembly requested the ILC "... to pay
attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal
Chamber of the International Court of Justice. Rapporteur
Ricardo Alfaro441 answered the desirability as well as the
possibility of the creation of an international criminal
court "unhesitatingly in the affirmative. ,,442 His
successor, Emil Sandstrom, had an opposite opinion as to the
issue of the desirability as well as the possibility to
create an international criminal court.443 Furthermore, he
came to the conclusion that
the General Assembly envisioned the international
criminal court as a principal organ of the United
Nations, analogous to the ICJ, and that such a court
could be created only by amending the Charter of the
United Nations via Article 108 of the U.N. Charter. 444
Nevertheless, the majority of the members of the ILC
affirmed both the desirability as well as the possibility of
establishing an international criminal court. The members
preferred the option of a new independent judicial insti-
tution and rejected the idea of a Criminal Chamber of the
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ICJ.445 When the Sixth Committee discussed the report of
the ILC the response of the representatives of States was
divided.446 This situation was solved by shifting the work
to another body. Recognizing that the Draft Code on Crimes
against Peace and Security of Mankind needed a procedural
counterpart, and continuing the efforts in connection with
Article 6 of the Genocide Convention in 1951, on
recommendation of the Sixth Committee, the General Assembly
appointed a 17-member committee to elaborate a statute for
an international criminal court. In 1953, this Committee in
International Criminal Jurisdiction concluded a draft
statute for an international criminal court. However, like
the Draft Code of 1954, further considerations were
postponed until the definition of the notion
"aggression,,447could be defined.
2.3. Recent Efforts
In its 36th (1981-1982) session the General Assembly
invited the ILC to resume its work on the Draft Code of
Crimes aqainst Peace and Security of Mankind.448 In 1983,
the ILC asked the Assembly whether their considerations
should include the establishment of an international
criminal court. The General Assembly answered the question
in 1989 in the affirmative and directed the ILC to report at
the next session about the problems pertaining to an
international criminal court.449 In 1990 the General
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Assembly renewed the legal basis for the work of the ILC
when it invited the Commission
to consider further and analyses the issues raised in
its report450 on the question of an international
criminal jurisdiction, including the possibility of
establishing an international criminal court or other
international criminal trial mechanism.451
a. Jurisdiction
The Report of the Special Rapporteur
Special Rapporteur, Mr. DouDou Thiam, concentrated his
ninth report on (a) the court's jurisdiction and (b) the
requirements for submission of cases to the court. The
report of the special rapporteur included one draft article
that covers the jurisdiction of the court.452 This article
revised the draft statute of the Committee on International
Jurisdiction of 1953.453 The Special Rapporteur stressed
that the report should be a mere "test of opinion" and
"basis for discussion," and the debate would be a useful
guide to him at a later stage. "454 Thiam tried to find a
compromise between political feasibility of an international
criminal court and creating an effective instrument. In
order to avoid a drawback like in the 1950s, it was
important to find a solution that would get sufficient
backing of the States and that would have a chance to be
ratified by a considerable number of members of the United
Nations.
One major obstacle was the conflict between
international criminal jurisdiction and principle of State
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sovereignty. In order to draft a prudent and feasible
provision, Thiam added several restrictions of the court's
jurisdiction in paragraph 1 and 2 of the draft article.
First, paragraph 1 clarifies that the jurisdiction of the
court refers only to individuals and not to States. 455
Paragraph 1 foresees in square brackets that the
jurisdiction should not cover all crimes of the draft code,
but only those listed in an annex to the statute. This annex
should restrict the court's competence "to crimes forming
the subject of international conventions, on which general
agreement therefore existed, such as genocide, apartheid,
certain war crimes and certain acts of terrorism .... ,,456
Paragraph 1 further provided that the principle of
universality as laid down in the Geneva Conventions457
would not be applied. Instead, Thiam proposed a system of
"conferment of jurisdiction." States that have jurisdiction
on grounds of the principle of territoriality will loose
this jurisdiction only if they confer their jurisdiction
upon the international criminal court. Paragraph 2
provides, in an ambiguous relationship to paragraph I, that
in addition to paragraph 1 there are four other groups of
States that have to confer jurisdiction to the court if
their (1) national legislation gives them jurisdiction (2)
on grounds of the principles of active and passive
personality and real protection.458
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Reaction on the Report
The reaction on the report was rather divided. Three
major problems were discussed among the members on
jurisdiction: (1) The nature or extent of jurisdiction, (2)
the jurisdiction ratione materiae and (3) Conferment of
jurisdiction. Only arguments of interest will be addressed
in this manuscript. 459
Whether the court should have exclusive or only
concurrent jurisdiction was debated. Some members endorsed
the idea that the court should have only jurisdiction "where
national courts declared that they were not competent. ,,460
However, this would create conflicts of jurisdiction so
other members enhanced the idea of exclusive jurisdiction of
the court. However, the latter idea is unrealistic and
unlikely to get sufficient support of States. A preferable
third way would give the court "jurisdiction to review
(either on appeal or on cassation) decisions handed down by
national courts. ,,461 The undeniable advantage of this
solution is that impartiality and objectivity would be
ensured and the intrusion in State sovereignty would be kept
on a minimum extent.
Another proposal worth considering is to determine the
jurisdiction according to the nature of the crime. Within
this proposal, States had rather different ideas. One
realistic and reasonable solution would be to reserve
exclusive jurisdiction "in particular for crimes under
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international conventions which stipulated that the
perpetrators were to be tried by an international tribunal,
such as the crime of genocide. ,,462 This well balanced
approach might get sufficient support of the members because
it also reflects the concern of State Sovereignty.
This latter proposal is linked with the issue of what
jurisdiction ratione materiae the prospective court should
have. A group of members supported the pragmatic idea of the
Special Rapporteur to limit the jurisdiction to "a very
small category of crimes of extreme gravity ... ,,463 that are
already defined in international instruments like genocide.
However, there were also proposals in the opposite
direction, i.e., to extend the jurisdiction to international
crimes in general. It is doubtful that the latter proposal
is realistic or will find any considerable encouragement of
the States. The principle of State sovereignty is still too
strong for a considerable number of States to accept that
broad jurisdiction.
A third major point of criticism and reservations was
the conferring of jurisdiction as laid down in paragraph 1
and especially paragraph 2 of the draft article. Indeed,
the approach of the Special Rapporteur to find a feasible
compromise that would be able to get sufficient support of
States has to be appreciated. However, one can doubt if a
system like paragraph 2 works effectively. In a con-
siderable amount of cases, conferring of jurisdiction of too
110
many States would be necessary. A second argument devalues
paragraph 2 of the draft article. The overwhelming majority
of crimes under ILC Draft of 1991 were crimes directed
against States. The notion of crimes under international
law implies, however, that the wrongful act is of such a
gravity that "the question of jurisdiction [is] of concern
not only to individual States but to the international
communi ty as a whole." 464 The proposal of the Rapporteur
would not only go behind the universality principle as laid
down in the Genocide Convention and in the Geneva law, but
also "drop the concept of a crime under international
law. ,,465 Therefore, it is unlikely that the draft article
will be the prototype of a prospective article in the
Statute of an international criminal court. 466
b. Requirements of Submission of Cases before the Court in
the case of crimes against peace
Beside jurisdiction of an international criminal court,
the Special Rapporteur paid special attention to the
institution of criminal proceedings. The possible
relationship between the Security Council and an
International Criminal Court in cases of crimes against the
peace {aggression} is of special interest. The starting
point is that the Security Council as a political organ has
the competence to prevent a breach of peace and, in the case
of aggression, to restore peace and international security.
For this purpose, Article 39 of the Charter gives the
Security Council the competence to determine "the existence
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of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression. Conversely, a prospective Court has the
judicial task and competence to try individuals for breaches
of the peace or threats of aggression. 467 The overlapping
point is that in order to convict the perpetrators, the
court has to decide as a preliminary question whether there
exists a breach of peace. Hence, the issue arises that if
the proceeding of the court is subject to a prior consent of
the Security Council, does a breach of peace exists. Thiam
responded to this issue for crimes against peace in the
affirmative.468 The discussion revealed different opinions
of the members. One fear of several members was that because
of the veto right of the permanent members of the Security
Council, there might be situations where the Security
Council denies the existence of a breach of peace. One has
to consider that the affirmation of a breach of peace,
indeed, would not legally force the Security Council to take
action under Chapter VII. 469 However, the political
pressure in fact might lead to a moral obligation. Yet, such
a no-vote would invoke "a double standard"470 and result in
a dependence of the court as a judicial organ on political
circumstances. Therefore, the critics of the draft article
spoke in favor of a strict separation of the political and
legal level, i.e., that no prior consent should be
necessary. This proposal seems to be at least reasonable in
the case where the Security Council did not deal with the
LAW LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
112
matter. Here, "the international criminal court [sh]ould
have full freedom to determine the existence of an act of
aggression or a threat of aggression, where
appropriate."471 In cases where the Security Council
already addressed the concerned act of aggression, a
deviation and different appreciation of the court should be
possible from a negative or from a positive decision of the
Security Council. Otherwise, either the Security Councilor
the Court would loose some creditability. Therefore,
preference would be given to a formulation such as:
with regard to crimes of aggression and threats of
aggression the International Criminal Court must not
deviate from decisions of the Security Council that
concern with the existence of a any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
relevant to the case before the International Criminal
Court.
2.4. U.N.S.C. Resolution aoa4n
The consciousness for the necessity of a permanent
international criminal court exists and is constantly
growing. After the Iraq invasion in Kuwait, Secretary of
State James Baker announced deliberations of the United
States that "time is probably ripe to look seriously at the
idea of creating an international criminal court."473 Now,
more than four decades after the Nuernberg and Tokyo trials,
it seems that the words of Telford Taylor may prove to be
wrong. The continuing atrocities in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia fostered the preparedness of the community
to try the perpetrators by an international tribunal. In
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Resolution 808 of February 22, 1993, the Security Council
decided as follows:
that an international tribunal shall be established for
the prosecution of persons for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991;474
This decision is unique and raises several problems.
Moreover, it shows that after the end of the cold war the
Council is working more effectively than ever.475 First,
one may ask if it is at all possible to create a judicial
body by means other than an international treaty. Indeed,
the Charter of the IMT and the Peace Treaty of Versailles
were international agreements. However, the Tokyo
International Military Tribunal was created by special
proclamation of General McArthur and proves that there are
other possibilities than treaty law. Therefore, from this
point of view, the creation of an International Tribunal by
an international organ seems to be possible. The United
Nations has the competence with regard to the scope ratione
materiae to deal with humanitarian and human rights aspects.
The Charter addresses the protection of human being in
several articles.476 Therefore, the Security Council as
the main political organ has within the framework of the
Charter the competence to take measures to protect the
individual. The most effective form of protection is the
prosecution of the perpetrators.
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The basic question then, is whether the Security
Council as a political organ has the competence to create an
ad hoc judicial organ.
According to Article 39 of the Charter of the United
Nations, the legal basis for the establishment of the
tribunal is that the measure "maintain[s] or restore[s]
international peace and security. "477 For reasons
addressed above, the international aspect in the conflict in
the territory of the form~r Yugoslavia is relatively easy to
affirm. The Council reiterated in several preceding
resolutions that the conflict in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia constitutes a threat to peace.478 The fact that
since May 22, 1992, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegowina have been members of the United Nations and the
involvement of Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the
Yugoslav People's Army (JNV) in the fighting in the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegowina further strengthens the
international character of the conflict.
The French Report to the Security Council speaks of
" the former Yugoslavia and the States that have replaced
it .... "479 But even if one regards the conflict as a civil
war, the international threat to peace can be affirmed by
the fact that the fighting caused waves of refugees that
"have some potentially serious, observable effects on
neighboring countries, particularly Bulgaria and Hungary."
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480 Within Chapter VI I of the Charter of the United
Nations, the Security Council has a threefold option of
legal basis for his action. The use of armed force according
to Article 42 of the Charter is not relevant in this case.
It is possible to argue that Article 41 includes measures
like the establishment of an ad hoc judicial organ. Indeed,
Article 41 refers primarily to economic sanctions. However,
sentence 2 of Article 41 says that the non-military measures
only "include" different kinds of economic sanctions.481
The list, therefore, is not conclusive and gives the
Security Council a wide digression to take the steps it
regards necessary. Beyond these two provisions, it is
recognized today that the Security Council may also take
measures without special reference to Article 41 or Article
42, but on the basis of the general competence Chapter VII
gives to the Council. Whether the establishment of an ad
hoc war crimes tribunal belongs to the possible measures
that the "fathers" of the Charter had in mind when they
created Chapter VII remains questionable. The legislative
history does not give an answer to this question and, hence,
at least does not exclude this possibility.
The French Report distinguishes between the
establishment of an permanent universal criminal court and
the creation of an ad hoc tribunal. With regard to the
former, the Committee "would be very reluctant "482 to
affirm a competence of the Security Council under Chapter
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VII. Interpreting the Charter IIdynamically and
teleologically, the Committee believes, however, that the
Security Council could, if necessary, establish such an ad
hoc tribunal by virtue of the powers conferred on it by
Chapter VI I of the Charter .... 11483 The French Report sees
the legal basis of the establishment of the prospective
tribunal in Article 41.484 It states that lithe criterion
for a contemporary interpretation of Article 41 is the
commensurability to the object that is sought. 11485 Under
this interpretation, the French jurists conclude that the
establishment of an ad hoc tribunal can be justified if it
is the appropriate measure at the right time IIthat seems
likely to attain or facilitate the objective of restoring
international peace and security. 11486 Another interesting
aspect that the French Report addresses is the issue of
whether the tribunal looses its legitimacy at the moment the
hostilities cease. Arguably, restoration of peace is
fulfilled at this moment. With the argument that Chapter
VII also serves the IImaintenancellof peace, and this aim is
achieved by the trials of the tribunal, they answer the
question in the affirmative way. 487
In the last paragraph of Resolution 808, the Security
Council asked the Secretary General to submit a report
within 60 days. It remains to be seen what proposals and
consideration the Secretary General will submit to the
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Security Council for the "... effective and expeditious
implementation of the decision of the Security Council ...."
CHAPTER IV
DISTINCTION BETWEEN WAR AND OTHER HOSTILITIES
Today international law supplies various instruments
and documents that contain individual responsibility for war
crimes.488 The question that remains is in which conflicts
are these sources applicable. The answer largely depends on
the legal content of the notion "war," i.e., under what
situation of conflict crimes are war crimes. This issue
arises first and foremost in the context of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol of 1977. They are
applicable because they are the most important current
conventional instruments in the laws of war and explicitly
define the prerequisites the conflict has to fulfill.
The legal content of the notion "war" is disputed and
options of commentators are various. Here, we focus and
restrict the inquiry on the purpose of this work: Which
situations are covered by the provisions that create
individual responsibility and define war crimes, and what is
the consequence if these sources are not applicable to
certain types of conflict? One situation of conflict is
given particular consideration because of their actuality:
the relationship between United Nations operation and the
laws of war.
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1. The Notion of "Armed Conflicts,,489
Treaties of the 19th and early 20th century only
referred to the situation of war. For example, the
Additional Articles relating to the Condition of the Wounded
in War of 20 October 20, 1868490 or the Laws of Hague491
In this instrument the notion "war" signifies an armed
"formally recognized situation involving two or more States
and entailing a whole of specific legal consequences
provided by international law of war ...."492This
definition of war contains two decisive elements. First,
the state of war preliminates a declaration of war or at
least recognition of the existence of a state of war between
two parties. This element may be called a subjective
element since it depends of the personal view of the
involved parties. Second, parties of the war must be states.
With the foundation of the League of Nations the
"achievement of peace ..., principally 'obligations not to
resort to war' "493became an international considered goal
laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Henceforth, states preferred to start war without
declaration or at least recognition.494 In these
situations of "non-war"495 the Hague and Geneva Law was not
applicable, a consequence of the Sovereignty of States.
However, States realized the necessity to establish a
set of rules for the protection of civil population,
wounded, and prisoners of war that should be applicable
regardless the willingness of State to recognize the
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situation of war. Under the impression of two World Wars,
Article 2, paragraph I, of the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 mentions explicitly the applicability of the rules
regardless of the recognizing of the situation of war,496
and clarifies further that the notion of "armed conflict" is
"purely factual. "497 The undeniable advantage of choosing
this notion is that it has a more objective nature. This
means that "the occurrence of the facto hostilities [between
two countries overstepping a certain threshold] is
sufficient ...."498for the application of the Geneva
Conventions. According to some commentators499 the notion
of "armed conflict" should express that certain fields of
the laws of war are not only applicable in conflicts between
states (i.e., international conflicts), but also in other
non-international conflicts (i.e, where only one state is
involved) .
The Geneva Convention, however, does not provide any
definition of the notion of armed conflict. Consequently,
the question of the relationship between the terms of "war"
and "armed conflict" arises. Are they identical, includes
the notion of armed conflict as a larger concept war or vice
versa. From the development and history, it seems to be
more likely that first and foremost the subjective criteria
of recognition or declaration of war should be deleted. The
wording of Article 2, paragraph I, however, speaks of
"...war ...or other armed conflict ...." Accordingly, in the
Geneva Law war is one form of armed conflict, and,
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therefore, the latter has the larger scale. Most
commentators follow this view. 500
The second prerequisite, the statehood, refers to the
issue, what kind of conflict exists and what kind of law is
applicable if there is only one state involved, in so called
non-international conflicts. International practice of the
United Nations broadened the notion of international
conflicts.
2. Types of War
Commentators follow different approaches to categorize
the different types of war. Ingrid Detter de Lupis
distinguishes between geographical wars, programmatic wars
and methodological war501 Another distinction which should
be added even though the meaning and content is very debated
is international and non-international wars or conflicts.
As we will see later, the distinction is decisive for the
rules of law applicable and especially for patterns of
implementation, i.e, indirect individual responsibility.
2.1. International conflicts
If we follow the given geographical category for
differentiation, we first may distinguish between interstate
war, non-interstate wars and wars and other types of war.
Originally the definition of war implied that at least two
states were involved. In the case of interstate war,
doubtless, the armed conflict has international character. A
current example was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi armed
forces.502 The question with regard to the conflict in the
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former Yugoslavia is more difficult. The issue with regard
to Bosnia-Herzegovina is even more difficult. In
international law, statehood requires four prerequisites:
Territory, a people, government, which has effective
internal control over the state's territory, and no
dependance from another state. The recognition by other
states may be an indicator, but is no prerequisite of
statehood itself. The hostilities between Serbia and
Croatia may be qualified as war between two states because
Croatia had declared its independence before the outbreak of
the fighting and possessed a defined territory, people and a
Government. The fact that certain parts of the territory
were involved in fighting with the Serbian dominated JNA is
no hindrance, as far as a effective control over most of the
territory exists. This a question of degree. The Croatian
Government under President Franjo Tudjman exercised a
sufficient and an effective control over the territory.
The issue is more difficult with respect to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Serbian armed forces and militia control, at
least currently, more than the half of Bosnian territory and
the Bosnian Government never had effective control over the
territory. Therefore, one may be tempted not to qualify the
situation as interstate war.
At this point the question arises if other criteria may
qualify a conflict as an international conflict. Today, the
overwhelming majority of scholars agree that a conflict may
get international character with the involvement of the
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United Nations. The Security Council very early regarded
the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia as a
threat to international peace and security and confirmed
this in numerous consequent resolutions that address the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 503 Hence, current
international law provides the somewhat curious situation
that a civil war may exist that is transformed with the
involvement of actions of the United Nations under Chapter
VII into an international armed conflict.
Three more examples of actions under Chapter VII should
also reveal the broadening of the notion "international,"
that is of primary importance for the applicability of the
war crimes concept. Only the threat of international peace
and security comes within the scope of Chapter VII and
consequently gives the Security Council the competence to
authorize States to use force. However, with the end of the
Cold War this notion seems to change its definition. In
Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991 the Security Council decided
to qualify the repression of the Iraqi civilian population,
especially the Shiite and Kurds, as a threat to
international peace and security. Later only a possible
Chinese veto in the Security Council "stopped the Council
from adopting the resolution under Chapter 7, thus giving
countries the right to use force to help the Curds and
Shiite" .504 Here, one may submit the international
character from the fact that the prosecuted Curds in the
north fled into Iranian and turkish territory and the Shiite
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in the south, also tried to get shelter in Iran. Less clear
was the "Operation Hope" in Somalia by American and French
troops. The decision of the Security Council that United
States troops could use force if they needed to "establish a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations is
highly disputable. The qualification of "the threat of
human tragedy" as "a threat to international peace and
security"SOS is a very wide, if not a novel interpretation
of the notion "international conflict". This reveals that
the principle of non-intervention may loose its importance
in the future - at least for humanitarian operations - of
its importance. The legal concept of "international" is in
a transitional phase.
2.2. Non-International Conflicts
Non-international conflicts is a field to which
international law gave only insufficient consideration.
Until the middle of this century, there is nearly no proof
of conventional or customary international law that
addresses in particular the situations of non-international
conflicts. Like issues of international jurisdiction
internal affairs belonged in former times to the exclusive
domain of internal affairs. One of the first conventional
law that supplied minimum standards in all kinds of armed
conflicts were the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Only a few
sources of international law are available:
1. Article 85 of Lieber Code of 1863
2. Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event
of Civil Strife. Signed at Havana, 20 Feb. 1928
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3. Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions of 1949
4. Report on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N., Nov.
20, 1969, in Schindler/Toman at 714: 3. Guerrilla
Warfare
5. Report on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N., Nov.20,
1969, in Schindler/Toman at 716: 4.Internal Conflicts
6. Report on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, U.N., Nov.20,
1969, in Schindler/Toman at 732: Part IX: Guerrilla
Warfare
7. Nicaragua v. United States of America, case before ICJ,
25 ILM 1023 (1986)
8. Security Council Res. 688 of April 5, 1991 in 30 ILM 858
(1991)
9. Additional Protocol I for "Wars of National Liberation"
10. Additional Protocol II
a. Definition and Distinction
In the literature, different approaches are undertaken
to define the notion of non-international conflicts. 506
The initial rule is simple. All conflicts that do not fall
under the category of international conflicts, which were
discussed earlier, are non-international conflicts, i.e.,
conflicts that are not between two States or conflicts
within the territory of one State with the involvement of
another State507 or the United Nations.
Article 1, paragraph 1, of Additional Protocol II,
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and Article 1 of
Protocol I supply a negative definition. Article 3 common
only uses the notion of "armed conflict not of an
international character ...." without further definition.
This provision has to be read in the context of Article 2,
paragraph 1 common that provides that
.... [t]he Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties ....
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Indeed, the Conventions do not explicitly say that only
States may be Contracting Parties. However, from the
documents on the Conference that drafted the Geneva
Conventions, it becomes clear that only situations of armed
(or non-armedS08) conflict between two States should be
covered by the Conventions.so9 Consequently, we can
distinguish between conflicts of two or more States and
other conflicts.
This narrow interpretation of international armed
conflicts was broadened by Article 1, paragraph 4 of
Additional Protocol I that provided that the rules of the
Geneva Conventions as a whole are applicable to wars of
national liberation.slO Furthermore, it has been seen that
the United Nations practice under Chapter VII enlarged the
notion of international armed conflict. Article 1 of
Additional Protocol II that describes the material field of
application introduces a new category of non-international
armed conflicts. It restricts the application in
noninternational conflicts as laid down in Article 3 common
with a fourfold threshold, that leads to a "de facto
statehood"sll: (1) parties to the conflict can only be
armed forces of High Contracting Party confronts armed
dissident forces or other organized armed groups which are
under (2) responsible command. Furthermore, the insurgents
(3) must control of part of the territory that enables them
(4) to undertake sustained and concerted nature of military
operations and to implement the Protocol. Article 1,
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paragraph 2 of Protocol II furthermore supplies a borderline
between armed conflict and internal disturbance/internal
tension. Most commentators agree that this "bottom line" is
also valid for common Article 3.512 Hence the legal system
of the Geneva Conventions can be drawn as follows:
(1) international conflicts: Geneva
Conventions/Additional Protocol I
(2) War of National Liberation: Geneva
Conventions/Additional Protocol I
(3) non-international conflicts: Article 3 common
(4) non-international conflicts that fulfill fourfold
threshold: Additional Protocol II and Article 3 common.
(5) internal disturbances and tensions: no
applicability of Geneva law.513
b. Notion of Civil Wars, Wars of National Liberation, Mixed
International and Non-International Wars.
Civil War
It is difficult to find a clear definition of civil
war. However, according to the Geneva law, it is a struggle
by armed force of a certain intensity5~ between the
government in power and a organized group of citizens of the
state. Recent examples are Somalia,515 Liberia51G
Kampuchea, 517El Salvador518.
A legal consequence of the existence of a civil war is
that the Geneva Law regards the conflict as being of a non-
international nature. 519 Hence, the Geneva Conventions
are, except for Article 3 common, not applicable. Under the
prerequisites discussed above also Additional Protocol II
also may give protection to the combatants.
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War of National Liberation
In addition to the geographical classification of types
of wars[ a distinction is also possible by teleological
criteria that asks to the purpose of the war.520 For
purposes of this paper[ only the IIwarof national
liberationll will be addressed. According to Article 1[
paragraph 4[ of Additional Protocol I[ a war of liberation
is an
armed conflict in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination[ as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations.
This wording was the result of the efforts of the
United Nations to legitimate the struggle of the prescribed
colonial peoples and to give IImaterial and moral support to
national liberation movements in colonial territories.1I521
The right of self-determination embraces [ according to
Article 1[ paragraph 1[ of the International Covenants on
Human Rights[ the right of all people to IIfreely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic [
social and cultural development. IIThe general recognized
examples are the PLOt ANC and SWAPO.
This is the only kind of conflict in which the Geneva
system does not maintain the distinction between
international and noninternational. The separating legal
criterion of liberation wars from other civil wars is the
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distinctive applicable set of law. As cited above, Article
1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I, provides in the
beginning sentence that the described conflicts are
included in the notion "armed conflicts" as laid down in
Article 1, paragraph 3, of Additional Protocol I and Article
2 common of the four Geneva Conventions. Whether one says
that, consequently, war of liberation is an international
conflict (with the argument that there is an international
concern for this kind of struggle) or, as other
commentators, that for this kind of geographically regarded
internal conflict the Geneva Law for international law is
applicable, has not to be decided. 522
It is significant that the whole set of rules of the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I for conflicts
between two States can be made applicable. Like all
international instruments and as laid down in Article 2
common, the rules become applicable if both are contracting
parties of the Treaty. As the liberation movement will not
be a High-Contracting Party of the Protocol or Conventions,
Article 96, paragraph 4, provides that the authority of the
liberation movement "may undertake to apply the Conventions
and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of
unilateral declaration." This declaration has the immediate
effect that the Government and the liberation movement have
"the same rights and obligations as those which have been
assumed by a High Contracting Party to Conventions and this
Protocol." Consequently the system of "grave breaches" and
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the "implementation system" is applicable, i.e., victims of
liberation wars enjoy the same protection, and the
Government and the authority of the liberation movement have
the obligation to try (or extradite) perpetrators, and
soldiers have the indirect obligations and responsibilities
emerging from the Geneva Law as in international conflicts.
Hence, in a war of national liberation after the unilateral
declaration of the liberation movement, authority between
the latter and the Government of the High Contracting Party,
indirect individual responsibility for war crimes according
to the Geneva system exists.
Internationalized War, "Mixed"ArmedConflicts523
Mixed Conflicts are "conflicts containing elements of
both noninternational and international conflicts,,524Here,
one has to distinguish between intervention by or on behalf
of the United Nations or intervention by a State. 525
In the mixed international-noninternational conflicts, two
fields of law are applicable. The judgment of the I.C.J. in
the Nicaragua v. United States of America reflects the
leading opinion among commentators:
The conflict between the contra forces and those of
the Government of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which
is "not of an international character." The acts of
the contra towards the Nicaraguan Government are
therefore governed by the law applicable to conflicts
of that character; whereas the actions of the United
States in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal
rules relating to international conflicts. 526
131
Whether this principle is also applicable in situations
where the United Nations are involved will be discussed
later.
c. Legal Consequence for Non-International War
Chapter II revealed that the actus reus of common
Article 3 and of the relevant article of Additional Protocol
II cover the most heinous grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions.527 Consequently the actus reus of some of the
most important war crimes is available. 528 Article 3,
which was "inspired to prevent a recurrence of the Spanish
civil war", 529 reflects "elementary considerations of
humanity. ,,530 The difference is that Article 3, common to
the Geneva Convention and Protocol II, does not supply any
implementation obligation. 531 However, the ICRC or other
impartial humanitarian institutions can offer their services
"but the parties have no formal [legal] obligation to accept
them. ,,532 There is no conventional obligation of the
Contracting Parties to try or extradite pulpits. Hence, the
system of indirect individual responsibility is not secured.
Article 3 of the Conventions
Charles Lysaght discusses533 the enforcement mechanism
applicable to Common Article 3, as far as the Conventions
are concerned. This opinion, however, is not represen-
tative. As most commentators Jean S. Picet takes the view
that "it is no longer the Convention as a whole which will
be applicable, but only the provisions of Article 3
itself. ,,534 Another interesting question concerns who is
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bound by Article 3 common. According to this provision, any
party to a non-international armed conflict has to apply the
provisions laid down in Article 3, i.e., not only the
government forces of the signatory party, but also the
insurgents, although they never signed the Convention should
be bound. The legal basis for imposing obligations, as laid
down in Common Article 3, on subjects that never signed the
very instrument is questionable. Lysaght argues that "when
a government ratifies a convention it does so on behalf of
all its nationals, including those who may revolt against
it. ,,535
3. Criticism and conclusions536
Many commentators have rejected the current distinction
as described. The protection for civilian, PoW and injured
people involved in fighting is absolutely inadequate in
noninternational situations. 537 The applicability of the
four Geneva Conventions is too narrow in ratione personea
and ratione materiae. The set of rules applicable to
noninternational conflicts with Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II are not satisfactory. Many commentators and
institutions of high authority speak in favor of an
application of the laws of war to all kind of armed
conflicts that overstep a certain level538 This follows in
particular from the goal of humanitarian law: The protection
of the individual in any kind of armed conflict. Some
commentators cite the ICJ in Nicaraqua v. United States of
America.539 They maintain that the Court expressed in
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favor of the applicability of rules of the Geneva
Conventions other than Article 3 to noninternational
conflicts because the court stated that
[t]he United States is [on grounds of Article 1 of the
Geneva Conventions] under an obligation not to
encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in
Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of
Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Convention ...
However, this conclusion does not seem to be correct.
The author fails to say that the ICJ came to this conclusion
after two others had mentioned the same presumptions: The
actions of the United States against Nicaragua have to be
regarded under the rules of international law. Furthermore,
Article 3 is applicable as a minimum standard of
humanitarian law in armed conflicts of international armed
conflicts as well. Considering this, it seems obvious that
the ICJ did not want to apply Article 1 to noninternational
conflicts, but the outset was an international conflict in
which, of course, Article 1 and, in addition, Article 3 are
applicable.
A modest approach would be to lower the threshold for
the applicability of Protocol II to the same level as
Article 3 common of the Geneva Conventions demands, i.e.,
the only threshold for the applicability should be a certain
intensity of the armed conflict as laid down in Article 1
paragraph 3 of Protocol II. But this solution does not
provide any applicability of the implementation system of
the Geneva Conventions.
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But also (at least indirect) individual responsibility
on grounds of international law is in particular in non-
international conflicts desirable and necessary. An
efficient protection of human rights and imposition of
humanitarian law in situations of war consist of two
elements: The creation of norms that protect the individual
by condemning the conduct and a set of rules that guarantees
the efficient prosecution and punishment of the
perpetrators. The conduct of insurgents were subject to
"rules regarding violations of the laws of war, such as
concerning war crimes and those encompassing the basic
Nuremberg principles. ,,540 Moreover, in particular in the
situation of civil wars and insurrection against a
established regime, the perpetrators belonging to the
established system normally do not need to be afraid of
prosecution unless the insurgents reach power. Therefore
responsibility under municipal law is not very effective
under these circumstances. Hence, on both sides of the
insurgents and the established government, a direct
individual responsibility on grounds of international law is
necessary to gain a certain degree of deterrence. It has
been proven that indirect individual responsibility for the
commitment of grave breaches exist until now only for
international conflicts.
Theoretically there are two possibilities to enlarge
the applicability of the implementation system of the Geneva
Conventions: Either to extend the application of the rules
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in question as far as possible to all combatants and
situation of armed conflicts (with maintenance of the
distinction international - noninternational); or, to
abolish the distinction between international and
noninternational armed conflicts. The latter was a result
of the ILC in draft Article 22, paragraph 2, that provides
individual responsibility for exceptionally serious war
crimes. According to this paragraph "for the purpose of
this Code, an exceptionally serious war crime is an
exceptionally serious violation of principles and rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict .... ,,~l In
the commentary, the IJC declares that this expression also
covers "non-international armed conflicts covered by Article
3 of the four conventions. ,,542 It remains to be seen
whether States are willing to accept the given proposals.
Practice proves that states are more than reluctant to
accept the applicability of international law in non-
international conflicts.
CHAPTER V AND CONCLUSION
THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR TO UNITED NATIONS FORCES
In August of 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared it
as a province of Iraq. The Security Council condemned the
action as a breach of peace, called on Iraq to withdraw the
troops and empowered the members of the U.N. to take non-
military and military sanctions to enforce the request. 543
On January 16, 1991, Allied forces under the command of the
United States accomplished the Security Council Resolution
and forced Iraq by use of military force to withdraw from
the occupied Kuwait territory. In December of 1992, the
Security Council decided to start a humanitarian relief
operation in Somalia. 544 In Kampuchea, the United Nations
installed as a peace-keeping force a "Transitional
Authori ty" to secure the peace treaty of Paris. 545
The proliferation of United Nations operations in areas
of conflict allover the world raises the question of
whether the soldiers of the U.N. or national soldiers under
U.N. authorization may commit war crimes, and with the
consequences that there may exist also some individual
responsibility. Are the United Nations forces bound to the
Geneva Conventions III and IV? Can use of armed force under
Security Council authorization be declared as "war" or
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worth closer consideration:
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United Nations forces? From this outset in particular two
Some important documents are
1. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law,
24-26 April 1952
2. Resolution of the Institute of International Law of 1963
3. Declaration of the Secretary General of 1956
4. Letter of the Secretary General to the ICRC of 1962
5. Resolution of the" Conseil des Delegues du Congres de la
Croix Rouge Internationale" of 1964
6. Regulations of the Secretary General for UNEF, ONUC and
UNIFICYP
7. Agreements between the United Nations and the particants
of UNFICYP
8. 1971 Zagreb Resolution of the Institute of International
Law on Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of
Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which the United Nations
Forces May be Engaged.
9. 1975 Wiesbaden Resolution of the lnstitute of
International Law on Conditions of Application of Rules
Other Than Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to
Hostilities in which the United Nations Forces May be
Engaged, Res. of the Institute of International Law at
Wiesbaden, 13 August 1975
documents are available.
Also in this Chapter only few international instruments and
to the implementations system of the Geneva Conventions.
United Nations may try and prosecute perpetrators analogous
crimes may be committed? The second problem is, if the
consequence that against the members of the U.N. troops war
humanitarian laws of war, in particular as PoW under Geneva
convention III. If this question is affirmed, with the
"armed conflict"? Are the laws of war applicable towards the
questions arise. Are U.N. soldiers protected by the
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1. Peacekeeping-Operations and Enforcement-Action under
Chapter VIIs46
Basically, one has to distinguish between U.N. troops
as peace-keeping forces and U.N. forces enforcing Security
Council decisions under Chapter VII.
Peace-keeping operations are commenced with the consent
of the parties, in particular the host State. 547 The
decision may be made by the Security Councilor of the
General Assembly. 548 Current examples for peace keeping
operations are UNIFIL (U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon) by
Res. 684 (1991); UNFICYP in Cyprus by Res. 697 (1991); UNTAC
(U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia) by Res. 718
(1991); ONUSAL (U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador) by
Res. 693 (1991) and UNAVEM (U.N. Angola Verification
Mission) by Res. 696 (1991). Altogether, as of January of
1993 the United Nations ran 13 peacekeeping operations.s49
In addition, the U.N. may intervene in a conflict on
grounds of Chapter VII of the Charter on a formal and
binding Security Council decision to enforce the restoration
or maintenance of peace and international security. A
precondition is that the Security Council states according
to Article 39, that there exists a situation endangering
international peace and security. Then, economic or
military actions may be taken. The peace-keeping or
enforcement action itself may either be lead by forces under
national command on behalf of a U.N.-Resolution or under the
command of the United Nations.ssG In the latter case, the
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U.N.552 or were under United Nations command but consisted
an abstention (China)
Conversely, the soldiers of the relief action in
2. Applicable Humanitarian Laws of War in United Nations
Opera tionssss
As it has been seen, the recent actions of the Security
Council authorized with 12 votes to 2 (Cuba and Yemen) and
In Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, the Security
Council under Chapter VII like the humanitarian relief
that aid shipments reach those in need in Bosnia and
of national contingents553 because the organization does
forces may consist either of national contingents or set up
and security" in an extensive way. Furthermore the
through individual recruitment. 551 Most military actions
the notion of "threat or breach for the international peace
not possess sufficient military staff.
borderline between a peace-keeping operation and enforcement
of the U.N. were executed either by states on behalf of the
humanitarian operation. However, in the conflict in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia the Security Council
are only permitted to apply military force in cases of self-
backed a resolution on Chapter VII that authorized the
operation in Somalia, prove that the organization interprets
actions becomes more and more diffuse. Peace-keeping forces
Herzegowina. "554
United Nations peace-keeping forces "to use force to insure
defense.
Somalia were empowered to use force to secure the
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...under Chapter VII of the Charter ...Member States
co-operation with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq
on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set
forth in paragraph 1 above [omitted], the above
mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent relevant decisions and to restore
international peace and security in the area;
This was the legal basis for operation "desert storm"
that liberated Kuwait from the occupation by the Iraq
forces. What existed between the United Nations and Iraq
war? The situation is different as the United Nations does
not only act as one State who defends its sovereignty, but
the organization acts on behalf the whole community to
restore or maintain international peace and security.
Questionable is whether this has an impact on the
application of the laws of war in relation to the aggressor
and the United Nations forces. As seen, the majority of
scholars interprets the notion war in the sense of
"international armed conflict. ,,556 Under the objective
criteria of armed conflict fall all hostilities that
overstep a certain intensity. Hence, from this point of
view the laws of war remain applicable.
However, the United Nations is not a High Contracting
Party of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocols. 557
Hence, these instrument do not automatically bind the United
Nations and soldiers acting for the Organization. Besides,
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols ignore the
possibility of an involvement of the United Nations in an
armed conflict. There is no existing convention addressing
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to the conduct of United Nations forces "... [n]or has the
United Nations enacted any special or detailed regulations
of its forces. ,,558 The question is, therefore, (1) if the
aggressor State has to apply the Geneva Law to the forces of
the United Nations and (2) if the United Nations forces are
bound by the principles laid down in the Geneva Laws, either
by analogous application, customary international law or
declaration of the Secretary General.
2.1. Obligation of the Aggressor to Comply with the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols.
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols are
applicable in all situations of an international armed
conflict.559 If the aggressor is a High Contracting Party,
and this is very likely, 560 then Article 2, paragraph 2,
sentence 1 provides that the aggressor is only bound by the
Convention in relation to the Non-Contracting Party "if the
latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof." However,
beyond this, most of the actus reus of the grave breaches
are customary international law that binds the
aggressor.561 Consequently , individuals belonging to the
aggressor who commits war crimes against members of the
forces of the United Nations remain individually responsible
to the extent discussed earlier.
2.2. Compliance of the United Nations with Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols.
This issue was raised for the first time with the
United Nations operation in Korea, where the "large-scale
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hostilities by United Nations forces [led] inevitable [to]
certain breaches of the laws of war .... 11562 One of the
first international documents that addresses the involvent
of the United Nations is Resolution I of the
Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 563
In 1956, during the UNEF operation, the issue arose as
to whether the United Nations forces are bound to
international humanitarian law. It was disputed after World
War II whether the United Nations could deviate from the
laws of war. This idea goes back to a doctrine that
proposed that on the grounds of the development in
international law towards illegality of aggression the
victim State should have the right to deviate from certain
laws of war. 564 The application of the principle of
discrimination towards United Nations forces was fostered by
several authors as well as the Institute of International
Law in a Resolution in September, 1963. However, both
references of law pointed out that this principle should not
be applicable to the humanitarian rules of warfare, i.e., to
the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols.565 The Institute of International Law continued
its work566 on the question what rules of armed conflict
should be applicable in hostilities in which the United
Nations forces are engaged and issued two Resolutions that
are the first overall approach to codify in detail the issue
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of application of the laws of war on United Nations forces.
today the relevant documents on this issue.567This consent
led in 1971 to the adoption of Article 2 of the Zagreb
Resolution that provides that
The Humanitarian rules of the law of armed conflict
apply to the United Nations as of right and they must
be complied with in every circumstances by United
Nations Forces which are engaged in hostilities.
The rules to in the preceding paragraph include, in
particular:
(a) the rules pertaining to the conduct of hostilities
in general and especially those prohibiting the use or some
uses of certain weapons, those concerning means of injury
the other party, and those relating to the distinction
between military and non-military objectives;
(b) the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949;
(c) the rules which aim at protecting civilian persons
and property.
This provision covers almost all of the existing
international law that provides individual responsibility
for war crimes.56B (a) refers to the law of the Hague,
which is nowadays partly embodied in Article 85, paragraphs
III and IV of Additional Protocol I. The Geneva Conventions
are explicitly mentioned in (b). (c) refers to Article 85,
paragraph 3 (b) and Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii) of
Additional Protocol I, and Article 147 of Geneva Convention
IV.
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This view is also shared by the United Nations. The
ICRC contributed considerably to this development. Already
in 1956, during the UNEF operation the ICRC asked for a
declaration of the Secretary General concerning the
application of humanitarian law for the UNEF forces. From
this time on a dialogue between the Secretary General and
the ICRC emerged that confirms the content of Article 2 of
the Zagreb Resolution. On November 8, 1962, the Secretary
wrote to the ICRC that the UNO insisted on its armed forces
in the field apply the principles of the Geneva Convention
of 1949 as scrupulously as possible.569 Furthermore the
ICRC issued resolutions that calIon the United Nations to
give a declaration that confirms the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions.57o Indeed, until now such a
declaration is missing. However, a step on this road are
the directions of the Secretary General to the United
Nations forces in the operations of UNEF, ONUC and
UNFICyp.571 Hence, in these operations the applicability
of the humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols was ensured. Article 3
A, paragraph 1, of the Zagreb Resolution tries to codify
this practice.572 This applies at least as long as the
United Forces are established by individual recruitment. If
the United Nations force is composed of national
contingents, Article 3 B, paragraph 1, of the Zagreb
Resolution proposes that either the United Nations should
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issue regulations directly to the soldiers or conclude
agreement with the States that supply the contingent in
which the compliance with humanitarian law is secured.573
Besides, even if it is denied that national contingents are
bound by the position taken by the United Nations and if no
agreements between the United Nations and the States
contributing the contingents exist, the members of the
national contingents remain bound and responsible to the
same extent that their State is bound to either conventional
or customary international humanitarian law. The same goes
if a United Nations action is under the command of one
State.
As a result it can be stated that there is a strong
view within the United Nations and among scholars that the
involvement of United Nations forces does not change any
applicability of humanitarian law. If this result is
achieved on grounds of customary international law, or an
analogous application of conventional international law
remains unclear. In particular, the content of the grave
breaches in the Geneva Conventions remain applicable. 574
3. Enforcement and Criminal Jurisdiction575
If one submits that the humanitarian rules of war and
in particular the Geneva system of grave breaches remain
applicable in conflicts where United Nations forces are
involved, the logical consequence is to ask who should have
the criminal jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the
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perpetrators. Besides the jurisdiction of States here, the
issue arises if the United Nations has at all the legal
competence and capacity for criminal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, one has to distinguish for whom the United
Nations should have criminal jurisdiction: nationals of the
aggressor, members of forces that were set up through
individual recruitment, and members of national contingents.
Finally, it remains the case of whether a State or a number
of States act under the command of one State on behalf of
the United Nations.
Criminal Jurisdiction over members of United Nations Forces
The Geneva Conventions provide for the principle of
universal jurisdiction, i.e., every State is entitled and
obliged to try (or extradite) soldiers who commit grave
breaches. Consequently, it is out of the question that, in
particular, the State whose national committed a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions has jurisdiction to try its
national. This is valid in situations where States act on
behalf of a United Nations authorization or the enforcement
action is under United Nations command but consists of
national contingents.
Disputed among commentators is whether the United
Nations "itself could assume criminal and disciplinary
jurisdiction over the members of the Force. "576 The
question arose in the aftermath of the Congo conflict.577
Seyersted answers this issue in the affirmative way, 578
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however, without omitting that most commentators reject this
approach. 579 In particular, the implementation- system580
of the Geneva Conventions should be applicable to the United
Nations. As already seen, the fathers of the Geneva
Conventions had only States as Contracting Parties in mind.
However, a teleological and dynamic interpretation should be
able to overcome this failure. The Geneva Convention gives
the Parties the choice to try or extradite. Consequently,
as long as the United Nations does not possess a criminal
court, it could hand over the perpetrator to another
contracting party which has made out a prima facie case.581
However, this approach
will remain theoretical, as long as [United Nations
forces] are composed, not of personel recruited
individually, but of national contingents, and as long
as the States providing these contingents ...wish to
retain the criminal power for themselves. 582
The recent United Nations forces in Yugoslavia, Kuwait
and Somalia, yet, reveal that the tendency is just the
opposite: More and more operation under Chapter VII are
pure operations of States under the authorization of the
United Nations. In this cases the contingent State of the
culprit has to give his consent that the United Nations have
jurisdiction over him. Nothing indicates that the States
supplying the national contingents are willing to do so.
In peace-keeping operations, jurisdiction for military
members is mostly restricted by agreements between the
United Nations and the host country. These agreements
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contain in particular provisions that establish immunity for
the members of peace-keeping operations and confer exclusive
jurisdiction upon the State that supplies the military
members of the United Nations forces. At the 45th session
of the General Assembly the Secretary General presented a
"Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping
operations" .583 This document should serve as model for
further peace-keeping agreements. Under the chapter
"jurisdiction" paragraph 46, sentence 1, provides that
[a]ll members of the United Nations peace-keeping
operations ....shall be immune from legal process in
respect of words spoken or written and all acts
performed by them in their official capacity.
Paragraph 47 in particular addresses the criminal
conduct of the members of the United Nations peace-keeping
operation. The provision distinguishes between civilian
component and military members of the operation. Whereas
criminal proceedings in the host country against civilian
component depends upon ad hoc concluded agreements between
the Special representative/Commander of the peace-keeping
operation and the Government of the host country
[m]ilitary members of the military component of the
United Nations peace-keeping operation shall be subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective
participating States in respect of any criminal
offenses which may be committed by them in [host
country/territory.]
To secure the prosecution of the offenders, paragraph
48 provides that the Governments of the participating States
149
exercise jurisdiction over their nationals who commit crimes
in the territory of the host territory.
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to commit any of the offences defined in th preceding
paragraphs of this article." Y.B. ILC 1954, vol II, at 149,
152.
Art. 3 para. 3 of the ILC Draft of 1991: "Any
individual who commits an act constituting an attempt to
commit a crime against the peace and security of mankind [as
set out in arts .... J is responsible therefor and is liable
to punishment. Attempt means any commencement of execution
of a crime that failed or was halted only because of
circumstances independent of the perpetrator's intention."
U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at 198, 251.
158. ibid. at 254
159. Roeling, Aspects of Individual Responsibilitv, supra
note ..., at 217.
160. Art. 2 reads as follows: "The characterization of an
act or omission as a crime against the peace and security of
mankind is independent of internal law. The fact that an act
or omission is or is not punishable under internal law does
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not affect this characterization." U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at
238.
161. U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 242. Art. 86 para. 2 of Additional
Protocol I was the model for Art. 12 of the Draft. This
reflects the substantial identical wording. For the
commentary to Art. 12 see YB ILC 1988, vol. II (part II), at
70.
162. Compare Chapter 1.3.2. (a) FN .....
163. Compare art. 7 of the ILC Draft of 1991 and commentary.
Reprinted in YB ILC 1988, vol. II, (part II), at 68, 69; see
also art. 9 of the French Report, supra note ..., U.N. Doc.
S/25266 at 64.
164. This defence was relevant, e.g., in the trial of re
Krupp and Ten others. Reprinted in 15 Int'l L. Rep. 620
(1948). See also Einsatzqruppen case. Reprinted in 15 Int'l
L. Rep. 656 (1948). Compare furthermore Sunga, Individual
Responsibility, supra note ..., at 58, 59. A survey over
these cases gives Appleman, International Tribunals, supra
note ..., at 207-220 and 196-206.
165. Compare Yoram Dinstein, The Defense of Superior Orders
in International Law, at 156-164 (1965); See also Sunga,
Individual Responsibility, supra note ..., at 59, 60.
166. Compare art. 48 of Additional Protocol I. Art. 51, 57
and 85 of Additional Protocol I restrict the principle of
military necessity by the principle of proportionality. See
furthermore Stanley Levine, The Doctrine of Military
Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 Mil. L. Rev. 3-24
(1980) .
167. Compare art. 46 of Geneva Convention I, art. 47 of
Geneva Convention II. See also Bristol, The Laws of War and
Belliqerent Reprisal Aqainst Enemy Civilian Populations, 21
A.F.L.Rev. 397-431 (1979) and Sunga, Individual
Responsibility, supra note ..., at 60 and seq.
168. Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ..., at 55.
169. This issue arose in particular with the crime against
peace. With regard to the intended judgement of former
Emperor Wilhelm II for breach of the peace (see below ...)
the representative of the United States in the Commission on
Responsibility of Authors of the War stated that there
should not be a "punishment created after the commission of
the act." Reprinted in 14 AJIL 95, 136. The same criticism
was announced after World War II for the creation of
individual responsibility for crimes against peace. See
Chapter 11.2.1.
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170. Art. 8 para. 1 of the ICL Draft of 1991 and commentary.
Reprinted in YB ILC 1988, vol. II (part II), at 69, 70.
171. Already in this early case the defence of superior
orders was rejected. For the trial compare Sunga, Individual
Responsibility, supra note ..., at 18, 19 and Levie, Armed
Conflicts, supra note ..., at 904.
172. See 16 AJIL 708 (1922).
173. A similar provision containes the special proclamation
that created the IMT for the Far East. Compare Levie, Armed
Conflicts, supra note ..., at 904.
174. Y.B. ILC 1950, vol. II, at 374, 375 para. 105.
175. Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ..., at 57.
176. Compare Jean S. Picet, Commentary to Geneva Convention
III, at 622, 623.
177. Principle 4: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to
order of his government or of a superior does not relief
him from responsibility under international law, provided a
moral choice was in fact possible to him." Y.B. ILC 1950,
vol. II, at 374, 375.
178. Art. 11 of the ILC Draft of 1991 reads as follows: "The
fact that an individual charged with a crime against peace
and security of mankind acted pursuant to an order of a
Government or a superior does not relief him of criminal
responsibility if, in the circumstances at the time, it was
possible for him not to comply with the order." U.N. Doc.
A/46/10, at 198, 242.
179. Most commentator approve the existence of customary
international law. See e.g. Sunga, Individual
Responsibility, supra note ..., at 56.
180. Compare U.N. Doc. A/46/10, at 198, 256.
181. American Military Tribunals, case No.7, vol. XI, at 1271
and 1236.
182. Levie, Armed Conflicts, supra note ..., at 904.
183. Art. 7 para. 3 of the French Report, supra note ..., is
substantial identical with Art. 13 of the Draft. Compare
U.N. Doc. S/25266, at 64. Therefore it is here not
reprinted. The wording of Art. 5 of the Italian Report,
supra note ..., is slightly different: " The fact that the
author of one of the crimes referred to in article 4 may
have acted on the orders of a Government or of a
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hierarchical superior does not exclude criminal liability
if, given the circumstances at the time of the offence, the
offender had the possibility had the possibility to
disregard such orders." U.N. Doc. S/25300,
at 3.
184. Instructive are the comments of the French Report,
supra note .... U.N. Doc. S/25266, at 16-18 para. 52-56.
185. For the monistic and dualistic theories compare
Verdross/Simma, Universelles Voelkerrecht, supra note ..., at
@ 71-74.
186. See Art. 24 GG of the Federal Republic of Germany. Art .
.... of the Constitution of the French Republic. A different
system provides the United States on grounds of the
supremacy clause in the constitution.
187. Principle 2 reads as follows: "The fact that internal
law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a
crime under international law does not relieve the person
who committed the act from responsibility under
international law." Reprinted in YB ILC 1950, vol. II, at
374, 375.
188. YB ILC 1950, vol. II, at 375 para. 102.
189. Article 10 para. 2 of the ILC Draft of 1991 reads as
follows: "Nothing in this article shall preclude the trial
and punishment of anyone for any act which, at the time when
it was committed, was criminal in accordance with
international law or domestic law applicable in conformity
with international law." For the text and commentary see YB
ILC 1988, vol. II (part II), at 69, 70.
190. French Report, supra note ..., U.N. Doc. S/25266, at 18
para. 56.
191. Compare Chapter I.
192. Burgos, Humanitarian Law, supra note ..., at 21.
193. Beyond this, according to the Geneva Conventions, a
state is not only entitled but obliged to extradite or
prosecute the offender.
194. The fact that actors in international law are, first
and foremost States includes also the consequence that
States (1) have obligations and (2) are responsible for
certain conducts. Most commentators also agree that certain
breaches of international law constitute e.g. because of
their intensity a (3) criminal action. They are a crime
against every nation and may be called, therefore,
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international crime. The ILC is working for decades on Draft
Code for State Responsibility. Article 19, that addresses to
international crimes and international delicts, defines
international crimes as
II [a]n internationally wrongful act which results from
the breach by a State of an international obligation so
essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the
international community that its breach is recognized as a
crime by that community as a whole, constitutes an
international crime. II
But this seems to be one of the few points of consensus.
Highly disputed is what consequences follow from a breach of
international law, i.e. (4) what kind of responsibility
exists: penal or only civil sanctions (reparation) and
connected with this issue (5) what enforcement should be
applied. Compare Bassiouni, International Criminal Law,
supra note ..., at 19 and 146 and seq. See further Drost,
Humanicide, supra note ...; For the work of the ILC on the
Draft Code compare Shabtai Rosenne, The International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility and
Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma (ed.), United Nations
Codification of State Responsibility. A critical analysis of
article 19 can be found in Weiler, Casses & Spinedi (ed.)
International Crimes of States.
195. For a survey compare Bassiouni, International Crimes,
supra note ..., at 1-27.
196. Instructive Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra
note ... at 17 and seq.
197. Sometimes, like in the Genocide Convention, a crime
refers to both situations.
198. Cherif M. Bassiouni, Penal Characteristics of
Conventional International Criminal Law [hereinafter Penal
Characteristics], 15 Case W.Res.J.Int'l L. 27 (1983)
199. Levie, Armed Conflicts, supra note ...., at lv.
200. Id. at lv.
201. Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law [hereinafter
Criminal Law], 5 IYoHR 55, 68.
202. Alike Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, supra
note ... at 147 point 1.1.
203. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note.
204. Levie, Armed Conflicts, supra note ..., at lv. A
different categorization can be found in Ingrid Detter de
Lupis, The Law of War, at 56-67 (1987). Also Yoram Dinstein
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draws a different classification: (1) Peace-time offenses
and war-time offenses, (2) private and official offenses,
(3) offenses connected and offenses not connected with human
rights violations. Dinstein, Criminal Law, supra note ... at
75.
205. The categorization of 'crimes against humanity' under
'protection of fundamental human rights' is problematic
because the application of crimes against humanity
originally was restricted to situations that have certain
links with war. In contrast according to article 1 Genocide
is applicable in situations of war as well as situations of
peace. Therefore, it should be added that" [b]oth, [crimes
against humanity and Genocide] are in some respect also
within the scope of war crimes." Levie, Armed Conflicts,
supra note ..., at liv.
206. For reasons of completeness three other instruments
should be mentioned:
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, signed at Paris,
16 April 1856. Reprinted in Schindler/Toman, Armed
Conflicts, supra note ..., at 787.
Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field, signed at Geneva, 22 August
1846. Id. at 279.
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, signed at
St. Petersberg, 29 November/ 11 December 1868. Id. at 101.
207. The Peace Conference of The Hague of 1899 intended,
beside the goal reflecting its name, to conclude instruments
for the "limitation [of] the progressive development of
existing armaments". Schindler/Toman, Armed Conflicts, supra
note ..., at 49. Three conventions were concluded: Convention
I for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences,
Convention II Regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and Convention III for the Adaption to Maritime Warfare. The
Second International Peace Conference at The Hague of 1907
concluded ten conventions, that partly revised the existing
three conventions and enlarged the rules on behavior in
times of war. The rules are partly adopted and revised in
the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949. The Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are reprinted id.
at No.7, 38 (Conventions of 1899), 6, 8, 41, 63-68, 85 and
86 Conventions of 1907). For the History of the Conferences
and Conventions see furthermore Joerg M. Moessner, Haque
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, in Encyclopedia, supra
note ..., at 204 and seq.
208. For the History of the Conventions compare Jean S. Picet,
Commentary to Geneva Convention III, Introduction.
209. See Chapter 1.1.
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210. See Chapter IV.1.2.b. (1)
211. liThevery basis of humanitarian law is that some means,
irrespective of the legitimacy of course, must not be used
even in situations of war. II Burgos, Humanitarian Law, supra
note ..., at 22.
212. Combatants, Civilians and PoW.
213. Compare Lupis, War, supra note ... at 130; See also
Michel Veuthey, Guerilla et Droit Humanitaire [hereinafter
Guerilla], at 4-6 (1983).
214. A list of all international humanitarian law
instruments can be found in Veuthey, Guerilla, supra
note ..., at 3 FN 12.
215. Id. at 5 FN 19.
216. Id. at 5 FN19
217. Id. at 5, 6; See also Lupis, War, supra note ..., at 128
and Levie, Armed Conflicts, supra note, at lv.
218. E.g. article 1 Genocide Convention. Alike Sunga,
Individual Responsibility, supra note ..., at 15-17.
219. Lupis, War, supra note ..., at 129.
220. Lupis divides the laws of war into two groups: (1) Jus
ad bellum and jus in bello and (2) The law of The Hague and
the law of Geneva. Lupis, War, supra note ... at 126-129.
This view, however, does not consider the fact that to a
large extent it is precisely The Hague law and the Geneva
law that are a major part of the existing jus in bello.
221. A more precise definition gives Bretton: II [L]esemble
des regles juridique applicables a la conduite des
hostilities, aux rapprt entre les belligerants, aux
relations entre les belligerants et les tiers au conflit,
aux conditions dans lesquelles les hostilites prennent
fon(?) et la paix est retablie." Paul Bretton, Le Droit de
la Guerre, at 8 (1970). Cited in Veuthey, Guerilla, supra
note ..., at 6 FN22.
222. Lupis, War, supra note ..., at xx.
223. U.N. Charter, art. 2 para. 4.
224. Bert V.A. Roeling, Crimes Aoainst Peace, in
Encyclopedia, supra note ..., at 133.
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225. For the history of the Peace Conferences of The Hague
and the Conventions compare Chapter 11.1.3.
226. Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907. Reprinted in
26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (2d) 920.
227. 13 AJIL 151, 250, Supplement (1919)
228. Commission on Responsibility of Authors of the War, 14
AJIL 95, 118, Supplement (1920).
229. Id. at 120.
230. Id. at 120.
231. Compare article 10-12, 15 para. 7 and 8. Reprinted in
13 AJIL 128 and seq. Supplement (1919).
232. 13 AJIL 128, 132, Supplement (1919).
233. Article 10 para. 1 sent. 1 reads as follows: "The
members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as
against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the
League." 13 AJIL 128, 131, Supplement (1919)
234. 13 AJIL 128, 134, Supplement (1919).
235. Roeling, Crimes Aqainst Peace, supra note ..., in
Encyclopedia, at 133, 134.
236. Published in 22 AJIL 109, Supplement (1928). For
further information compare Cynthia D. Wallace, Kelloqq-
Briand Pact, in Encyclopedia, supra note ..., at 236-239.
237. 22 AJIL 109, 115, Supplement (1928).
238. Roeling, Crimes Aqainst Peace, supra note ...., in
Encyclopedia at 133.
239. Compare Georg Schwarzenberger, 2 International Law as
A?plied bv International Courts and Tribunals at 486, 487
(1968). Cited in Sunga, Individual Responsibilitv, supra
note ..., at 39.
240. 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (1945).
241. For a short summery of the rulings of the IMT
concerning crimes against peace compare YB ILC 1950, vol.
II, at 376, 377 para. 110-118.
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242. This opinion supports also the fact that the
subordinate soldier in most cases has not the political
knowledge to decide whether he participates in an act of
aggression or self-defenses. Government controlled medias
like .... in rest-Yugoslavia are a striking example to
influence the public opinion about the initiation, course
and background of a conflict.
243. A different opinion have Sunga, Individual
Responsibility, supra note ..., at 37 and Dinstein, Aspects
of Individual Responsibility, supra note ..., 206, 210.
244. For briefing of the case see Appleman, Military
Tribunals, supra note ..., at 229-236.
245. Id. at 177-189.
246. Levie, Armed Conflicts, supra note .. at 908.
247. Apart from individual responsibility for it.
248. YB ILC 1950, vol. II, at 376 para. 111 and FN 11.
249. compare Trial of the Major War Criminals before the
International Criminal Tribunal, vol. I, Nuernberg 1947. See
also YB ILC 1950, vol. II, at 376 para. 111.
250. Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ..., at 37.
251. In a declaration dealing with aggression adopted by the
Assembly of the League of Nations on September 24, 1927, the
members of the League "declared ... that war [is] an
international crime. II YB ILC 1950, vol. II, at 376 para.
112. Germany subscribed this declaration. For further
examples compare id. and John P. Kenny, A Philosophical
Study of the International Military Tribunal [hereinafter
Philosophical Study], at 5-9.
252. Alike Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ...
at 36 and seq.i Affirmative also Kenny, Philosophical Study,
supra note ..., at 8-9.
253. Compare Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ...,
at 36 and seq.
254. Other cited documents were the preamble of the League
of Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes (Geneva Protocol) of 1924. Compare
furthermore YB ILC 1950, vol. II, at 376 para. 111 and 112.
255. For the legal value of the reference of the United
States Military Tribunal to Ex part Quirin compare Sunga,
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Individual Responsibilitv, supra note ... at 38 with further
references.
256. See Chapter 11.2.1.
257. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
258. U.N. Charter, art. 39 and 41.
259. U.N. Charter, art. 39 and 42.
260. U.N. Charter, article 103.
261. Prohibition of a certain conduct is one of the criteria
laid down above at Chapter 11.1.1. for the qualification of
the act as crime under international law.
262. A different issue is individual responsibility
therefor. However, some commentators speak in favor of
existing customary international law. Compare Sunga,
Individual Responsibilitv, supra note ..., at 21 and Roeling,
Crimes Aqainst Peace, in Encyclopedia, supra note .... , at
136
263. Different to evaluate is the issue of individual
responsibility.
264. One of the few non-members is Switzerland.
265. Compare Veuthey, Guerilla, supra note .... , at 6.
266. Art. 16 of the ILC Draft of 1991 reads as follows:
"1. An individual who as leader or organizer commits or
orders the commission of a threat of aggression shall, on
conviction thereof, be sentenced.
2. Threat of aggression consists of declarations,
communications, demonstrations of force or any other
measures which would give good reason to the Government of a
State to believe that aggression is being seriously
contemplated against that State." U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 198,
245.
267. U.N.G.A. Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970
concerning Friendly relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
[hereinafter Friendly Relations Resolution]. Furthermore
compare U.N.G.A. Resolution 42/22 of 18 November 1987 on the
Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Refraining from the Threat of Use of Force in International
Relations.
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268. Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in
and against Nicaragua, judgement of 27 June 1986, I.C.J.
reports, 1986, p. 14.
269. Id. para. 2
270. GAOR, 44th Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/44/10) at 180-
182.
271. Compare U.N.G.A. Resolution 897 (IX) of 4 December 1954.
272. Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the Definition of Aggression of
December 14, 1974. GAOR 29th Session, Supp.21
273. See in particular article 1 and 3 of the Resolution.
274. For more information see Commentary to article 15 in YB
ILC 1988, vol. II (part II), at 71, 72.
275. Art. 1 of Resolution 3314 and article 15 para. 2 and 3 of
the ILC Draft of 1991.
276. Art. 3 of Resolution 3314 and article 15 para. 4 of the
ILC Draft of 1991.
277. Compare art. 15 para. 4 (a), (b), (c) and (g) of the ILC
Draft of 1991. U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 198, 244.
278. U.N. Charter, art. 39-42 and 51 in particular.
279. Reprinted in Chapter 11.2.1.
280. YB ILC 1950, vol. II, at 376.
281. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note ....
282. Compare U.N.G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), GAOR, 20th Session,
Supplement 14 at 11.
283. Roeling, Crimes Aqainst Peace, supra note ..., at 136.
284. Art. 38 (b) of the Statute of the ICJ reads as follows:
"The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law, shall apply ... international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
285. See Roeling, Crimes Aqainst Peace, supra note ... at 135,
136.
286. Similar Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ...
at 41 when he writes: "Whether the definition of crimes
against peace includes individual responsibility is as yet
unclear."
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In favor this view speaks furthermore that despite article
15 and 16 of the Draft of the ILC neither the French, nor
the Italian or CSCE Report included a prosecution of crimes
against peace.
287. Compare Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ...
at 17 and seq. Compare id. at FN4 in particular for further
details.
288. Compare Chapter 1.2.1.
289. Lieber Instructions, article 47, supra note Reprinted
in Schindler/Toman, Armed Conflicts, supra note , at 3.
290. Art. 23 common and article 56 common of Convention II
of 1899 and Convention IV of 1907. Reprinted in
Schindler/Toman, Armed Conflicts, supra note .... , at 82, 83.
291. 13 AJIL 151, 250, Supplement (1919).
292. The Tokyo International Military Tribunal applied a
similar regulation laid down in their Charter. For the
history of the Trials compare Chapter 1.2.1.
293. 82 D.N.T.S. 279, 288.
294. Jescheck, War Crimes, supra note ..., in Encyclopedia, at
297.
295. This definition is a combination of Jescheck, War
Crimes, supra note ..., at 14, and Paul Bretton, Le Droit de
Guerre, at 8 (1970). Cited in Veuthey, Guerilla, supra
note ..., at 6 FN22.
296. The Geneva Law contains also crimes against humanity.
See Chapter II.4.2.b.
297. Ratification as at 31 January 1993: Geneva Convention
I: 170 -Geneva Convention II: 168 - Geneva Convention III:
174 - Geneva Convention IV: 164. Source D.N.S.C. Document
S/25266 at 20 FN 27.
298. Reprinted in 16 ILM at 1391-1449 (1977).
299. Burgos, Humanitarian Law, supra note ...., at 21.
300. Jean S. Picet, Commentary to Geneva Convention I, at 371.
301. 16 ILM 1391, 1428 (1977)
302. Article 2 and 3 are common all four Conventions.
Citations therefore are only given to one of the
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Conventions. Article 2 of Convention III is reprinted in 75
D.N.T.S. 135, 136 .
303. For the problems arising from this formulation see
Chapter IV.l.
304. Most commentators take the view that article 3 common
is also applicable in situations of international armed
conflict. Compare French Report, supra note ..., at 21 para.
67.
305. Schindler/Toman, Armed Conflicts, supra note ..., at
605. Compare id. for a short introduction to Additional
Protocol I.
306. 75 D.N.T.S. 135, 238.
307. For reasons of space this article is not reprinted here.
See 75 D.N.T.S. 135, 138.
308. 75 D.N.T.S. 287, 388.
309. 75 D.N.T.S. 287, 290.
310. Jean S. Picet, Commentary to Convention IV, at 46.
311. For the deliberations of the French Committee of
Jurists on this issue compare para. 60-62 of the French
Report, supra note ..., at S/25266 at 19 para. 60-62.
312. French Report, supra note ..., S/25266 at 62.
313. S/25266 at 25 para. 91.
314. Yugoslavia ratified the Conventions on 21 April 1950.
Serbia and Montenegro regard itself as successor of the
former Yugoslavia. For the newly independent States in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia compare declarations of
succession above Chapter I.2.c.
315. Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence on 25
June 1991.
316. Slavic muslims: about 44 per cent, Serbs: about 31 per
cent and croats about 17 percent. Compare Kirgis,
International Orqanizations, at 687 (manuskript 1992).
317. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinoski & Bruno Zimmermann
(ed.), Commentary to Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 Auqust 1949 [hereinafter
Commentary to the Additional Protocols], at 150.
318. Article 11 para. 2 (a)-(c).
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319. Burgos, Humanitarian Law, supra note ..., at 21 and FN 68.
320. This issue is addressed in Chapter IV.
321. For references compare Chapter IV.l.2.b. (4)
322. Compare Commentary to Art. 22 para. 2 of the ILC Draft of
1991. U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 198, 270.
323. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague, 14 May 1954.
Reprinted in 249 U.N.T.S. 216-239.
324. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific
Institutions and Historic Monuments, signed at Washington, 15
April 1935. Reprinted in Schindler/Toman, Armed Conflicts,
supra note ..., at 737. The pact was signed only by American
States. Compare for signatures id. at 740.
325. 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388.
326. For a survey of the history of the Convention compare
Schindler/Toman, Armed Conflicts, supra note ..., at 741.
327. 249 U.N.T.S. 216, 242.
328. Compare article 6 para. 1 (b) (vi). Reprinted in Chapter
II.3.2.a. (1)
329. The French argument, however, is presumably that "the
competence of the Tribunal may be limited to the most heinous
crimes. French report, supra note ..... , U.N. Doc. S/25266 at
21 para. 67.
330. Yugoslavia ratified the Convention on 13 February 1956.
331. Id.
332. Compare Additional Protocol I, article 53 sub-para. (b).
333. See Chapter 11.1.1.
334. UNWCC, supra note ..., at 34, 35.
335. French Document, supra note .... at 19 para. 59 (c).
336. Compare ILC Draft of 1954, Principles of Nuernberg, G.A.
Resolution 95 (I), U.N. Resolution 2712 on war criminals.
337. The French Jurists speak of an universal application of
the Conventions. Compare French Report, supra note ..., U.N.
Doc. S/25266 at 20 para. 65.
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338. U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 198, 269. Article 22 of the ILC
Draft reads as follows:
Exceptionallv serious war crimes
1. [omitted] compare Chapter I above ....
2. For the purpose of this Code, an exceptionally serious war
crime is an exceptionally serious violation of principles and
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict
consisting of any of the following acts:
(a) acts of inhumanity, cruelty or barbarity directed
against the life, dignity or physical or mental integrity of
persons [, in particular wilful killing, torture, mutilation,
biological experiments, taking hostages, compelling a
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power,
unjust delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war after the
cessation of active hostilities, deportation of transfer of
the civilian population and collective punishment] ;
(b) establishment of settlers in unoccupied territory and
changes to the demographic composition of an occupied
territory;
(c) use of unlawful weapons;
(d) employing methods or means of warfare which are
intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment;
(e) large-scale destruction of civilian property;
(f) wilful attacks on property of exceptional religious,
historical or cultural value.
339. For the commentary on the article, compare id. at 198,269-274.
340. A very cynical expression when one deliberates what war
crimes are not serious!
341. U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 198, 269, 270.
342. id. at 270
343. Id. at 198, 269.
344. Hereinafter only article 147 of Convention IV is cited.
This provision includes the actus reus of article 130 of
Convention III. See Chapter II.3.2.a. (1).
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345. For a list of relevant instruments and documents that
should be included under this term see commentary of the ILC.
Reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 198, 272 para. (8).
346. Id. at 271.
347. Article 2 common of the four Geneva Conventions and
article 1 of Additional Protocol I.
348. U.N. Doc. A/46/10 at 198, 270.
349. International Instruments and Documents: .
350. Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note ..., at 66.
351. Schindler/Toman, Armed Conflicts, supra note ..., at 70.
352. Leo Kupfer, Genocide [hereinafter Genocide], at 105.
Compare id. for the genocide against Armenians at 101-120.
353. Compare Sunga, Individual Responsibility, supra note .... ,
at 42 and Bassiouni, Crimes aqainst Humanity, in 1
International Criminal Law 51-71 (Bassiouni e. 1986).
354. UNWCC, supra note ..., at 36.
355. For a survey compare Sunga, Individual Responsibility,
supra note ..., at 42, 43.
356. Id. at 47.
357. E.g. the deportation of Jews, Gypsies, Catholics and
Protestants under the Hitler regime.
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559. Compare above art. 2 para. 1 common to the Geneva
Conventions. Reprinted in Chapter IV.1.
557. For the discussion if the organization could and should
accede the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, compare
Seyersted, United Nations Forces, supra note ..., at 314-398.
558. Seyersted, United Nations Forces, supra note ..., at 197.
555. This work focuses only on the for our investigation
relevant part of laws of war, the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocols. For a more information on the general
applicability of the laws of war compare e.g. compare
Bowett, United Nations Forces, supra note ...; See also
Seyersted, United Nations Forces, supra note ....
553. E.g. the operation in West New Guinea, UNEF, ONUC and
UNFICYP. For detailed information and a legal appreciation
on UNEF and ONUC compare D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces,
supra note ..., at 90-254.
552. Examples are Korea, operation dessert storm or the
Somalia relief operation. For more information on these
operations compare Kirgis, supra note .... at .... For Korea
compare D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, supra note ...,
at 29-60.
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565. Compare Seyersted, United Nations Forces, supra
note ..., at 224: "... all humanitarian rules protecting
individuals, whether military personnel or civilians, must
remain in force equally for both parties."
Like the Institute of International Law stated that the
principle of discrimination was subject to the reservation
that
"... obligations whose purpose is to restraint the horrors
of war and which are imposed on belligerent for humanitarian
reasons by Conventions in force, by the general principles
of law and by the rules of customary law, are always in
force for the parties in all categories of armed conflict
and apply equally to actions undertaken by the United
Nations." 50 Annuaire de l'institut de droit international.
Session d'Bruxelles 1963, I, at 115 and 116.
566. Compare a short survey Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff,
Documents on the Laws of War [hereinafter Documants], at
371.
567. Compare Resolution, adopted by the Institute of
International Law at its session at Zagreb, 3 September 1971
on the Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of
Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces
may be engaged. Reprinted in Schindler/Toman, Armed
Conflicts, supra note ..., at 903 and seq. See furthermore
Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at
its session at Wiesbaden, 13 August 1975, on the Conditions
of Application of Rules, Other than Humanitarian Rules, of
Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces
May Be Engaged. Id. at 907.
568. Compare above Chapter 11.3.2.
569. "oo.Je tiens aussi a conformer que l'ONU entend que ses
forces armees en compagne appliquent aussi scrupuleusement
que possible les principles de ces Conventions [de Geneve]."
International Review of the Red Cross, at 28 (1962). Cited
in Michael Bothe, Bericht ueber Entwicklunqen und Tendenzen
des Krieqsrecht seit den Nachkrieqskodifikationen
[hereinafter Entwiclungen], 35 ZaoRV 575, 583 (1975).
570. Reprinted in id. at 583.
571. Compare U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/UNEF/1; ST/SGB/ONUC/1 and
ST/SGB/UNFICYP/1. Article 44 of the UNEF regulations, e.g.
provided that
"]t]he Force shall observe the principles and spirit of
the general international Conventions applicable in the
conduct of military personnel." Roberts & Guelff, Documents,
supra note ..., at 372.
195
572. Art. 3 A para. 1 reads as follows: "If the United
Nations are set up through individual recruitment, the
United Nations shall issue regulations defining the rights
and duties of the members of such forces." Schindler/Toman,
Armed Conflicts, supra note ..., at 904.
573. Art. 3 B para. 1 of the Zagreb Resolution reads as
follows: "If the United Nations Forces are composed of
national contingents with regard to which the United Nations
has not issued any regulations such as those mentioned in
the proceeding paragraph, effective compliance with the
humanitarian rules of armed conflict must be secured through
agreements concluded between the Organization and the
several States which contribute contingents." Id. at 904.
574. More carefully expresses Bothe, Entwicklunqen, supra
note ..., at 585. According to his opinion there exists only
a consent that the humanitarian rules of the law of war as
such are applicable. Which provisions in concreto are
applicable, however, remains unclear.
575. Compare art. 3 of the Zagrep Resolution; furthermore
U.N. Doc. A/45/594; See also Bowett, United Nations Forces,
supra note ..., at 361-381.
576. Clark and Sohn, World Peace throuqh World Law at 311,
cited in Seyersted, supra note .... at 365. For opinions of
commentators against this proposal compare id. at 366 FN
173.
577. In 1964 the Military Advisor of the Secretary General
Gen. Maj. Rikhye described the Congo experience as follows:
"At present ...men are tried for offenses committed on UN
service under national codes in their national courts. Since
these courts cannot meet in the field this is often a
cumbrous and ineffective process." Furthermore "... there
have been few cases, including major crimes, in which the
government concerned were not disposed to make the necessary
investigations and to take suitable disciplinary action
against the culprits." Seyersted, United Nations Forces,
at 365.
578. For his argumentation and the scope of criminal
jurisdiction the United Nations should have, compare
Seyersted, United Nations Forces, supra note .... at 368-372.
579. G.I.A.D. Draper, cited in id. at 374.
580. Art. 129 of Convention III and art. 146 of Convention IV.
581. Seyersted, United Nations Forces, supra note ..., at 373.
582. Seyersted, United Nations Forces, supra note ..., at 372.
583. U.N. Doc. A/45/594 of 9 October 1990.
196
ASIL
ECOSOC
FLMN
G.A.
ICRC
ILA
ILC
ILM
IMT
IYoHR
JNA
N.Y. Times
s.c.
SZ
PKK
POW
U.N.
U.N.G.A.
U.N. S.C.
U.N.T.S.
UNWCC
Y.B. ILC
ABBREVIATIONS
American Society of International Law
Economic and Social Council
Salvadorian Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front
General Assembly
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Law Association
International Law Commission
International Legal Materials
International Military Tribunal
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights
Yugoslav People's Army
New York Times
Security Council
Sueddeutsche Zeitung
Kurdish Worker's Party
Prisoner of War
United Nations
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Treaty Series
United Nations War Crimes commission
Yearbook of the International Law Commission
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